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This is the second installment of a two-part essay. Limitations of space 
prevented the publication of the full essay in a previous issue of the 
Journal (Pereplyotchik 2020). My overall goal is to outline a strategy for 
integrating generative linguistics with a broadly pragmatist approach 
to meaning and communication. Two immensely useful guides in this 
venture are Robert Brandom and Paul Pietroski. Squarely in the Chom-
skyan tradition, Pietroski’s recent book, Conjoining Meanings, offers 
an approach to natural-language semantics that rejects foundational 
assumptions widely held amongst philosophers and linguists. In par-
ticular, he argues against extensionalism—the view that meanings are 
(or determine) truth and satisfaction conditions. Having arrived at the 
same conclusion by way of Brandom’s defl ationist account of truth and 
reference, I’ll argue that both theorists have important contributions to 
make to a broader anti-extensionalist approach to language. Part 1 of 
the essay was largely exegetical, laying out what I see as the core aspects 
of Brandom’s normative inferentialism (1) and Pietroski’s naturalistic 
semantics (2). Now, in Part 2, I argue that there are many convergen-
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ces between these two theoretical frameworks and, contrary to fi rst ap-
pearances, very few points of substantive disagreement between them. 
If the integration strategy that I propose is correct, then what appear 
to be sharply contrasting commitments are better seen as interrelated 
verbal differences that come down to different—but complementary—ex-
planatory goals. The residual disputes are, however, stubborn. I end by 
discussing how to square Pietroski’s commitment to predicativism with 
Brandom’s argument that a predicativist language is in principle inca-
pable of expressing ordinary conditionals.
Keywords: Generative linguistics; anti-extensionalism; normativ-
ity; inferentialism; predicativism; public language; communication.
3. Prospects for Ecumenicism
Introduction
In Part 1 of this essay, we surveyed the core commitments of two large-
scale theoretical frameworks in the philosophy of language—those of 
Robert Brandom and Paul Pietroski—and seen some of the ways in 
which they play out in the realm of semantics, including in detailed 
analyses of various linguistic constructions. It may appear that the two 
views are so different in substance and overall methodology that a con-
versation between the two is unlikely to bear much fruit. This is a large 
part of why so few conversations of this kind ever take place. In the 
present section, I argue for the contrary perspective, outlining an ecu-
menical approach that seeks to integrate the two in a variety of ways. 
In surveying what I take to be signifi cant points of convergence—which 
then serve as background for constraining residual disputes—I rebuff 
various superfi cial objections to the possibility of integration. In each 
case, I show how the theoretical differences that they point to can be 
reconciled without doing much (if any) violence to either view.
3.1 Truth, reference, and other non-explanatory notions
One obvious shared commitment between Brandom and Pietroski—in-
deed, the one that most clearly motivates the present enterprise—is 
their common rejection truth-conditional semantics. Let’s review the 
key points and add some new ones.
Pietroski surveys a battery of arguments against Davidson’s pro-
posal, including its more recent incarnations in possible-worlds seman-
tics. These include troubles with (i) empty names, (ii) co-extensive but 
non-synonymous expressions, (iii) polysemy, (iv) compositionality, (v) 
liar sentences, and (vi) event descriptions (inter alia). Brandom’s skep-
ticism is more foundational. On his view, an explanatory strategy that 
takes truth and reference—conceived of as “naturalizable” word-world 
relations—as fundamental semantic notions will require a metase-
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mantics that is, at best, optional, at worst, incoherent, and, at present, 
non-existent. Although Brandom doesn’t pretend to have supplied a 
knock-down argument against it, the fl aws he identifi es in the various 
attempts to work out this strategy strike me as fatal. Coupled with his 
development of a powerful alternative—a large-scale framework con-
structed from the top down, with pragmatics taking an unconventional 
leading role—as well as his well-motivated treatment of the notions of 
truth and reference, Brandom deals a serious blow to the mainstream 
approach of subordinating pragmatics to semantics.
Brandom’s main reason for pursuing a normative metasemantics 
is the inability of a purely descriptive (“naturalistic”) account to cap-
ture the normative notion of (in)correct rule-following. But this is not 
his only argument, and it’s worth taking a moment to spell out what 
strikes me as a potentially more powerful consideration—one that, in 
making fewer assumptions, can appeal to theorists of a broader stripe.
All extant attempts at “naturalizing” meaning, content, represen-
tation, and the like, have in common their insistence on employing in 
only alethic modal notions in their analyses. These include dispositions 
(Quine), causation (Stampe), causal covariance (Locke), natural law 
(Dretske), nomic possibility (e.g., Fodor’s “asymmetric dependence”), 
and even appeals to non-normative teleology (Cummins and, indepen-
dently, Millikan). Brandom points out that, even if these could account 
for ordinary empirical concepts, it’s not at all clear how they might be 
extended to the very concepts that appear in the analyses—i.e., the 
alethic modal notions just listed (among others).
While it’s possible to envision, if only dimly, how something in a 
person (or a brain) can causally co-vary with—or bear nomological rela-
tions to—water, mountains, and even crumpled shirts, there’s simply 
no naturalistic model for envisioning the relation between, on the one 
hand, the words ‘possible’, ‘disposition’, or ‘asymmetric dependence’, 
and, on the other hand, any particular set of things, events, or phe-
nomena out in the natural world. The same is arguably true for logi-
cal, mathematical, semantic, and deontic vocabulary. (Recall the fonts, 
functions, and fears from 2.3.) Indeed, the metasemantics doesn’t seem 
to get us much farther than ‘stick’ and ‘stone’. And the experts seem 
to have given up, since the late 1990s, on the hard at work of bringing 
‘fail’ and ‘decisively’ into the fold. One is well-advised not to bank on 
any striking new developments in this area, unless, of course, some-
thing dramatic happens in the surrounding domains of inquiry. (My 
money, for what it’s worth, is on the AI people.)
By contrast, a metasemantics that makes explicit and essential use 
of normative terms—paradigmatically, deontic modals—is ultimately 
able to “eat its own tail”, to use Brandom’s imagery, by shoring up a 
principled account of those very notions. As discussed in 1, Brandom 
treats normative expressions as serving the function, characteristic of 
logical vocabulary more generally, of expressing (i.e., making explicit) 
one’s commitments to the propriety of an inference or a plan of practi-
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cal action. Brandom (2008) offers, in addition, an account of alethic 
modal vocabulary (recall the safety measures for gasoline wicks in 1.2), 
as well as a detailed formal analysis of its many important relations, 
both semantic and pragmatic, to the deontic variety. In this way, his 
account can claim a major advantage over virtually any conceivable 
attempt at a naturalistic alternative. And, again, the force of this ar-
gument does not depend on a prior assumption about the normativity 
of meaning. This functions here not as a premise, but as a conclusion.
3.2 Naturalism
Residual worries about adopting a normative metasemantics will 
doubtless trouble self-avowed naturalists (including former versions 
of the present author), who tend to have a constitutional aversion to 
traffi cking in normative considerations. But this, too, should be tem-
pered—or so I’ll now argue. The concern is, to my mind, largely damp-
ened by the fact that Brandom’s norms are in no way “spooky” (despite 
drawing heavily on Kant), but, rather, grounded directly in social prac-
tices. Such practices consist of activities that are themselves rooted in 
each creature’s practical stance of reciprocal authority and responsibil-
ity to all others in its community.1 Such stances are overtly enacted 
and then, over time, socially instituted in a wholly non-miraculous 
fashion, by natural creatures.
Moreover, the resulting discursive/conceptual activities are open to 
assessment in respect of truth, accuracy, correctness, and overall fi del-
ity to “the facts on the ground” (as the assessor sees them). Indeed, the 
project of normative pragmatics is so obviously not supernatural that 
it’s not clear why the self-avowed “naturalist” should be at all wor-
ried. Even less clear is why anyone should get to dictate the terms of 
legitimate inquiry a priori. Why, after all, should our metasemantic 
theorizing not make any use of the perfectly familiar and logically well-
behaved deontic modal notions? Indeed, why even a lesser use of them 
than their alethic counterparts? What’s so special about alethic modal-
ity, anyway? Nothing much, so far as I can see.
Let me dwell on this point, for it seems to me that the knee-jerk 
resistance to normative theorizing is deeply ingrained in the natural-
ist’s mind. (I should know!) Pressing back against what now strikes 
1 There’s been confusion on this point, caused largely, I think, by Brandom’s 
uncharacteristically ill-chosen terminology. He gives the label “practical attitudes” 
to what I’ve here (re-)described as “embodied practical stances” on the part of a 
creature toward its community members. The use of the term ‘attitude’ has 
predictably conjured in the minds of some critics the notion of a propositional 
attitude—something that already bears a distinctively conceptual/intentional 
content. Plainly, this would render Brandom’s account viciously circular, as he is 
aiming to explicate the notion of propositional attitude content in terms of (what 
he calls) practical attitudes. If the latter already have intentional contents, then 
there’s obviously no diffi culty in spelling out other semantic/intentional notions 
downstream. Equally obviously, there would be no theoretical interest in doing so.
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me as an irrational prejudice, I exhort philosophers to actively discour-
age it, whatever the fate of Brandom’s philosophical project—or, for 
that matter, mine—turns out to be. Given our daily immersion in social 
norms and institutions, it’s frankly puzzling that so many theorists 
have allergic reactions to a deontic treatment of language. Norms are 
not puzzling. They are all around us, every moment of our lives. They 
permeate every social interaction we have and they are the subject of 
most of our thoughts, all of our plans, and our very conceptions of our 
own identities as free, responsible agents.
Moreover, with respect to linguistic norms in particular, there are 
(so far) no obvious examples in the natural world of linguistic abili-
ties arising in creatures outside of a relatively elaborate social context. 
Indeed, even intelligent artifacts wouldn’t count, if we ever made one, 
for they’d be related to the human community of happy roboticists in 
an obviously relevant way. So it’s not at all clear—not to me, at least—
why this aspect of naturalism should constrain our inquiries into lan-
guage and mentality. Obviously, naturalism has many other appealing 
features, but this doesn’t seem to be one of them.
The deafening silence from classical naturalists on this point has led 
some, e.g., Price (2010, 2013), to endorse Brandom’s normative infer-
entialist project and to embed it into a larger philosophical framework 
that eschews notions of correspondence, reference, “the representation 
relation”, etc. altogether. (No “mirrors”, he enjoins, using Rorty’s meta-
phor.) Price applies Brandom’s expressivist account of logical vocabu-
lary to all of human language. The resulting “global expressivism” is a 
key commitment of the novel brand of naturalism that he recommends 
to our attention—one that I fi nd deeply compelling.
What I’ve been describing as the “traditional” or “classical” natural-
ist view—i.e., the received view among soi-disant naturalists in the 
literature from Fodor onwards—maintains that we should draw on the 
tools, models, and concepts of natural science in characterizing atom-
istic word-object or sentence-fact relations—paradigmatically, refer-
ence and correspondence. On this picture, “the world” is seen through 
the lens of natural science (a category itself subject to some dispute). 
This is a metaphysical framework that has plenty of room for protons, 
genes, and brains, but stubbornly refuses to accommodate responsi-
bilities, entitlements, and the like—including, remarkably, persons (at 
least not in the fullest sense of that word; cf. Sellars 1963). The “ob-
jects” to which language relates us are thus limited by naturalist max-
ims to only the “natural” ones—whatever those are. For this reason, 
Price calls this view “object naturalism”.
The alternative that Price puts on offer is subject naturalism. This 
view retains a healthy and well-deserved respect for the deliverances 
of natural science, but refuses to go along with the philosophical fi c-
tion of “naturalizable” reference and correspondence relations. Rather, 
our naturalistic urges should be directed, Price argues, toward concept- 
and language-using subjects—i.e., the creatures who acquire, produce, 
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and consume languages, as just one tool in a larger biological-cum-so-
cial enterprise of maintaining homeostasis in the species. Paradigmati-
cally, such creatures are human persons, but any other naturally social 
creature can in principle be studied in this fashion.
What’s striking, to my mind, is how similar all of this sounds to the 
methodological aims of theorists like Chomsky and Pietroski. Although 
both call themselves naturalists, each has made determined efforts to 
debunk the idea that word-world relations are relevant to an empirical 
study of the human language faculty. Nor does either theorist harbor 
the ambition—characteristic of the “classical” naturalists mentioned 
earlier—to reduce intentionality, either by analysis or metaphysically, 
to some alethic modal base. Here’s Pietroski on the issue:
One can raise further questions about the sense(s) in which Begriffsplans 
are intentional, and which philosophical projects would be forfeited by ap-
pealing to unreduced capacities to generate and execute the instructions 
posited here; cp. Dummett. But my task is not to reduce linguistic meaning 
to some nonintentional basis. It’s hard enough to say what types of concepts 
can be fetched via lexical items, and which modes of composition can be 
invoked by complex Slang expressions.
This is another point of convergence with Brandom’s pragmatism, which 
likewise renounces the reductive aims of the classical naturalist project.
Of course, the mere fact that Pietroski declines to take up the is-
sue in CM doesn’t mean he has no dog in the fi ght elsewhere. (I don’t, 
myself, know.) By the same token, although it’s true that Brandom 
doesn’t aim to reduce intentional notions to some construct of natural 
science, it doesn’t follow, and isn’t true, that he has no reductive ambi-
tions at all. To the contrary, his normative inferentialism is designed 
precisely to reduce intentionality to something nonintentional, which, 
in his case, happens to be the normative. This is why normative prag-
matics serves for him as a metasemantics, in the fullest sense of the 
word. The ‘meta’ indicates not only that what’s on offer is a “theory 
of meaning”—rather than a fi rst-order “meaning theory”, to use Dum-
mett’s distinction. More importantly, it connotes that the semantics is 
herein subordinated to (i.e., must “answer to”, in an explanatory sense) 
the social norms that are the centerpiece of the pragmatics.
3.3 Referential purport
In keeping with his commitment to the methodological tenets of indi-
vidualism and internalism, Pietroski applies many of the points scout-
ed above to conceptual thought.
[S]ome readers may be unfamiliar or uncomfortable with talk of using rep-
resentations to think about things in certain ways. So some clarifi cation, re-
garding aboutness and ways, is in order. … The relevant notion of thinking 
about is intentional. We can think about unicorns, even though there are 
none. One can posit unicorns, wonder what they like to eat, diagnose vari-
ous observations as symptoms of unicorns, etc. Similarly, one can hypothe-
size that some planet passes between Mercury and the sun, call this alleged 
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planet ‘Vulcan’, and then think about Vulcan—to estimate its mass, or won-
der whether it is habitable—much as one might posit a planet Neptune that 
lies beyond Uranus. An episode of thinking about something can be such 
that for each thing, the episode isn’t one of thinking about that thing. … 
[I]n the course of proving that there is no greatest prime, it seems an ideal 
thinker can at least briefl y entertain a thought with a singular component 
that purports to indicate the greatest prime. … Paradoxes like Russell’s 
remind us that even idealized symbols can fail to make the intended contact 
with reality, at least if one is not very careful about the stipulations used to 
specify interpretations for the symbols.
I want to highlight a key point here: Pietroski is presupposing about 
concepts not that they succeed in referring—though he allows that 
some of them do—but that even empty concepts have intentional con-
tents. These latter plainly cannot be accounted for by positing straight-
forward metaphysical relations between words, on the one hand, and 
bits of the world, on the other.
This emphasis on intentionality in the sense of referential purport 
is crucial to Brandom’s project as well. Rather than setting out to ex-
plain successful reference/denotation, as the paradigms of perceptual 
and demonstrative reference have led many theorists to do (2.3), Bran-
dom sees it as necessary to fi rst explain how a creature can so much 
as purport to refer to one thing rather than another, and only later to 
furnish an account of what counts as success in this regard. Brandom 
is not alone in adopting this strategy. In the Gricean tradition, the 
homologous project is cast in terms of the intentional design of com-
municative acts—in particular, a speaker’s intentions to refer, denote, 
predicate, or to speak truly of something. But whether one uses the 
idioms of purport, design, or intention, the key point is that the phe-
nomenon under discussion does not involve a unique, naturalizable, or 
semantically-relevant mind-world relation.
That leaves wide open issues about the interface between language 
and reality, let alone larger questions of metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy. While Pietroski stays largely neutral on such topics in CM, Bran-
dom’s account makes quite defi nite commitments in these arenas. Nev-
ertheless, there is one place where the two quite clearly converge, and 
that is with respect to their treatments of de dicto and de re attitude 
ascriptions. Let’s take a look at that.
3.4 De dicto and de re constructions
In granting reasonable concessions to philosophers who stress the 
importance of mind-world relations for our theories of intentionality, 
meaning, concepts, and the like, Pietroski makes the following re-
marks:
I grant that ‘think about’ can also be used to talk about a relation that 
thinkers can bear to entities/stuff to which concepts can apply; see, e.g., 
Burge. In this “de re” sense, one can think about bosons and dark matter 
only if the world includes bosons and dark matter, about which one can 
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think. Any episode of thinking de re about Hesperus is an episode of think-
ing de re about Phosphorus. This extensional/externalistic notion has util-
ity, in ordinary conversations and perhaps in cognitive science, when the 
task is to describe representations of a shared environment for an audience 
who may represent that environment differently. But however this notion 
is related to words like ‘think’ and ‘about’, many animals have concepts that 
let them think about things in ways that are individuated intentionally. We 
animals may also have representations that are more heavily anchored in 
reality; see, e.g., Pylyshyn. But a lot of thought is intentional, however we 
describe it. (80)
It’s important to see that there are two distinct strands of thought here. 
One is about how some representations—again, paradigmatically those 
involved in perceptual or demonstrative reference—are “more heavily 
anchored in the world” than others. This might seem to put Pietroski’s 
view at odds with Brandom’s inferentialism, given how small an ex-
planatory role the latter gives to such “anchoring” relations. But this is 
worry is spurious.
Brandom’s account of perceptual commitments and default en-
titlements (MIE, ch. 4), as well as his (largely independent) account 
of demonstrative reference and “object-involving” thoughts, are fully 
compatible with—indeed, positively require—the existence of reliable 
nomic or causal relations between perceptible objects in the world and 
the perceptual mechanisms of a creature. There are, to be sure, heated 
debates about how exactly all of that works—e.g., whether the per-
cepts should be seen as having the function of bare demonstratives 
(Fodor and Pylyshyn 2015), noun phrases (Burge 2010), or inferentially 
integrated singular thoughts (Brandom 1994). But disagreements on 
these points are far downstream, theoretically, from the broadly meth-
odological commitments that I want to highlight here. It’s these that 
are the subject of the second strand of thought that I think we should 
distinguish here.
When Pietroski speaks of a “‘de re’ sense” in which one can think 
about or ascribe thoughts, he is at once talking about a certain kind of 
thought—the “object-involving” kind discussed above—but also, sepa-
rately, about a certain kind of thought ascription. The latter, he says, 
“has utility, in ordinary conversations and perhaps in cognitive science, 
when the task is to describe representations of a shared environment for 
an audience who may represent that environment differently” (op. cit.) 
Note that this circumscribes the function of de re ascriptions to what I 
think of as “the navigation of perspectival divides”. More prosaically, de 
re constructions allow language users to describe the environment in 
which a creature is deploying its concepts—as viewed by the describer 
(and often her audience)—while de dicto constructions function to as-
cribe the concepts so deployed. Here, then, we see another major point 
of convergence between Pietroski and Brandom. The latter provides an 
inferentialist analysis of de dicto and de re ascriptions, according which 
they perform precisely the function that Pietroski’s remarks indicate.
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According to Brandom, de dicto ascriptions make explicit the com-
mitments of the creature being described—not those of the ascriber, 
who may be either ignorant on the matter or hold commitments di-
rectly contrary to those ascribed. A speaker might say, “Dan thinks the 
greatest philosopher of language was Quine,” without having any com-
mitments one way or the other about whether philosophers exist, or 
about whether Quine was one of the greats. Indeed, the speaker might 
think that philosophers are bits of tofu and that Quine is a particularly 
fl avorful brand. None of that would matter with regard to the speaker’s 
entitlement to a de dicto claim about what Dan said.
By contrast, had the speaker employed a construction that func-
tions in the de re sense—e.g., the awkward ‘of’-constructions that we’ve 
inherited from Quine—then their own commitments would have come 
into play, with questions arising (at least in potentia) about their enti-
tlements to those commitments. For instance, had the speaker’s ascrip-
tion been (1), then their own commitments regarding the existence of 
philosophers, the list of the greats, and the possibility of philosophical 
tofu would have become immediately relevant.
(1) Regarding the greatest philosopher of language, Dan thinks that 
he was a piece of tofu!
Turning to subsentential cases, Brandom points out that such shifts in 
perspectival commitments can be indicated by operators such as “classi-
fi ed as”, “described as”, “conceptualized as”, and (importantly) “referred 
to as”. For instance, in saying “Jamal classifi ed some food as rabbit,” a 
speaker, Juanita, purports to indicate some food—the de re component of 
the ascription—and then says what concept Jamal applied to it (viz., RAB-
BIT). The word ‘as’ marks the onset of the de dicto component, ensuring 
that Juanita does not commit herself to the correctness of Jamal’s clas-
sifi cation. (Perhaps she knows that that the stuff on the plate is tofu.) 
Some theorists, having noted that RABBIT is the only concept that 
Juanita ascribes to Jamal, go on conjecture that Jamal can deploy this 
subsentential concept, all by itself, in classifying something as rabbit. 
Indeed, bewitched by surface grammar, some fail to notice the plain 
distinction between what Juanita is doing—i.e., describing (noncommit-
tally) one aspect of Jamal’s perspectival commitments—and what Jamal 
is thinking. A mistaken confl ation of these two phenomena is what gives 
rise, I suspect, to the widespread illusion that we can take as it as a da-
tum that each of us has ability to think of, classify, or refer to something, 
by deploying just one subsentential concept (or linguistic expression). I’ll 
argue later, following Brandom, that this idea is doubtful; prima facie, 
one can neither classify nor think about something without tokening 
complete thoughts. For instance, the case described, Jamal’s classifi ca-
tory act requires tokening the complete thought, CCC IS-RABBIT, where CCC 
is whatever concept he uses in thinking about the food on the plate.
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3.5 Interpersonal similarity of meaning and content
Many theorists hold, for reasons that are ultimately unpersuasive, that 
communication is a matter of passing a message, idea, meaning, or 
thought from speaker to hearer. As with throwing a frisbee, a success-
ful case in one in which the item sent by the speaker is the very same as 
the one received by the hearer—if only in the ideal. But, after the mid-
century work of Quine, Kuhn, Sellars, and many others who developed 
broadly holist ideas (e.g., Churchland 1979), it’s hard to see this picture 
as anything but optional. Brandom’s account of communication is one 
of the many that rejects it outright, modeling communication instead 
on activities like tango dancing, where partners has to give and take 
“in complementary fashion”; book-keeping, where each participant 
“keeps separate books” regarding her own commitments and those of 
other participants; and baseball games, where a common “scoreboard” 
shows what complex normative statuses each participant bears to each 
of the others.
Metaphors aside, Brandom’s inferentialism carries an explicit com-
mitment to holism about meaning and content. Many follow Fodor and 
Lepore (1992) in seeing this as the root of several major problems for 
his view. But the objections that Fodor and Lepore press are virtu-
ally all rooted in implausibly strong assumptions about the necessity 
of meaning/content identity—rather than mere similarity—for vari-
ous philosophical inquiries. These include the projects of adequately 
characterizing successful communication, interpersonal disagreement, 
and rational belief revision. It seems to me that Brandom’s accounts of 
these things are perfectly fi ne as they stand, but fans of holism seem to 
have gone scarce in recent years, and Fodorian views about meaning/
content identity have arguably become the received views in the fi eld.
In yet another clear case of both his iconoclasm and his signifi cant 
convergence with Brandom, Pietroski likewise rejects the identity-of-
meanings picture, though on grounds that are independent of any ho-
list commitment. Targeting fi rst the extensional account of meaning-
identity as co-extensiveness, Pietroski points out that 
speakers can connect the pronunciation of ‘pen’ to the same meaning with-
out determining a set of pens that they are talking about. If each speaker 
uses a polysemous word that lets her access a concept of writing imple-
ments, as opposed to animal enclosures, they resolve the homophony the 
same way and thereby avoid blatant miscommunication. In this sense, they 
connect a common pronunciation with a common meaning. But it doesn’t 
follow that any speaker used a word that has an extension... (18)
Later, Pietroski counsels us—wisely, in my view—to give up the whole 
idea that “successful communication requires speakers [to] use the 
same meanings/concepts” (33), regardless of the theoretical framework 
in which this idea is couched (extensional or otherwise). He views it as 
a mere idealization that “members of a community have acquired the 
same language—or that they use the same words, or words that have 
the same meanings.” Despite Brandom’s focus on social norms, shared 
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commitments, and the like, what Pietroski says here is entirely in line 
with his view. This will take some spelling out, which I undertake in 4. 
For now, let me emphasize that, if correct, then Pietroski’s take on this 
issue would severely undermine the (already fairly fl imsy) arguments 
against meaning holism.
3.6 The Pragmatics of Assessment
We’ve seen that Brandom places great stress on the notion of asser-
tion, and that he sees this as something that we should characterize in 
normative terms. Given Pietroski’s naturalist commitments, one might 
think that he disagrees. But this overlooks the key point that I will go 
on to make in the remainder of this discussion—namely that the theo-
retical aims of Pietroski’s semantic theory are so starkly different from 
those that animate Brandom’s inquiry that their common use of folk 
terms like ‘meaning’ should not bewitch us into thinking that they’re 
talking about the same phenomenon.
Pietroski’s target throughout CM is not communication, but the 
underlying psychological mechanisms that make it possible. When he 
does provide hints of his broader views about communication, what he 
says is entirely of a piece with Brandom’s normative pragmatism.
My own view is that truth and falsity are properties of certain evaluative 
actions—e.g., episodes of assertion or endorsement—and the corresponding 
propositional contents that are often described with the polysemous word 
‘thought’, as in ‘the thought that snow is white’ or ‘the thought constructed 
by executing that instruction’; cp. Strawson. (63, fn. 23)
As with all theory-laden terms, including (especially in this context) 
‘thought’, ‘meaning’, and ‘concept’, we should always remember that 
the aims and presuppositions of the inquiry are far more important to 
keep in view than the pronunciation of the jargon. Pietroski makes this 
point in the following passage.
Let’s not argue about nomenclature. One can use ‘concept’ more permis-
sively than I do, perhaps to include images or other representations that are 
not composable constituents of thoughts. One can also use ‘concept’ less per-
missively, perhaps to exclude representations that fail to meet certain nor-
mative constraints. Or one might reserve the term for certain contents, or 
ways of thinking about things, as opposed to symbols that have or represent 
contents. But I want to talk about a kind of physically instantiated compo-
sition that is important for cognitive science, along with a correspondingly 
demanding though non-normative notion of constituent, without denying 
that contents and nonconceptual representations are also important. (77)
We will go on in 4 to compare Brandom’s and Pietroski’s notions of 
“constituent,” where it will become important that Pietroski’s aims is to 
provide a non-normative account of constituency. For now, consider how 
this plays out with respect to Pietroski’s distinction between Olde and 
New Mentalese (2). Recall that Pietroski’s account has children starting 
off with Olde Mentalese concepts that fail to meet the conditions for as-
sembly by FL Begriffsplans, and later inventing new concepts that are 
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specially tailored for the job. For instance, Pietroski writes, “Ignoring 
tense for simplicity, we can form concepts equivalent to: GIVE(VENUS, __ , 
BESSIE); GIVE(VENUS, BESSIE, __ ); GIVE( __ , BESSIE, VENUS); GIVE( __, BESSIE, __ ); 
etc. But children may start with composable concepts that are less cog-
nitively productive” (101).
In the remainder of the discussion, I’ll lean heavily on the following 
two key points. First, much of what Pietroski says about the phyloge-
netically older “Fregean” modes of thought that permit internal substi-
tution is of a piece with the lessons that Brandom likewise draws from 
Frege. The second key point, which alone serves to resolve many of the 
apparent confl icts between the two views, is that Pietroski’s account 
is best be viewed as a (partial) theory of the subpersonal mechanisms 
that underlie our norm-tracking abilities, which in turn contribute to 
making possible the social practices of communication. For instance, 
Pietroski’s account of how a child comes to acquire the concepts that FL 
can assemble should, if correct, be regarded as laying down empirical 
constrains on the variety of norm-tracking social practices that a hu-
man child will master at various ages.
If the foregoing claims are correct, then the two theoretical enter-
prises not only share several key commitments, but they are actually 
complementary, each providing an important piece of the overall puz-
zle about how best to view language(s). While Brandom’s inquiry is 
neither descriptive nor psychological, his account clearly presupposes 
that there must be some descriptively correct account of how any crea-
ture’s sub-creatural cognitive architecture emerges, whether in early 
development or in its species’ socio-evolutionary (“memetic”) history. 
His claim is simply that such an account can’t be the end of the story. 
Rather, he argues, it’s the necessary groundwork for a much larger 
picture of the role of language in social practice.
Likewise, although Pietroski’s focus is the psychology of the indi-
vidual speaker-hearer—assumed to be universal within the species—
we’ve seen that there’s room for communal norms in his overall picture. 
Indeed, passages from CM contain explicit remarks about the norms 
that govern inquiry in the mature sciences—e.g., norms that serve to 
stabilize referential purport among expert chemists. Such norms, how-
ever, would reside largely at the level of pragmatics, which is decidedly 
not Pietroski’s focus in CM, nor a major aspect of Chomsky’s own work.
Perhaps, then, we can adapt David Marr’s familiar distinction be-
tween “levels of analysis”—if only by crude analogy—by viewing Bran-
dom as articulating a “high-level description” of the conditions that any 
language user must satisfy in order to count as such. If this suggestion 
is right, then Pietroski is best seen as telling us about the details of 
how this high-level description happens to be “implemented” or “real-
ized” in the human case. In the remainder of this essay, I will argue 
that there is no inherent confl ict between accounts pitched at distinct 
levels of inquiry. There could only be a substantive dispute if the they 
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shared a common domain. But, as Pietroski’s remarks in the following 
passage make clear, that’s just not so in the present case.
Let me digress, briefl y, to note a different response to concepts without Be-
deutungen. One might adopt a hyper-externalistic understanding of ‘ideal’, 
so that no ideal thinker has the concept VULCAN, and no ideal analog of this 
concept lacks a Bedeutung; cp. Evans, McDowell. But then an ideal thinker 
must not only have her mental house in good order, avoid paradox-inducing 
claims, and be largely en rapport with an environs free of Cartesian demons. 
In this hyper-externalistic sense, ideal thinkers are immune from certain 
kinds of errors, perhaps to the point of being unable to think about the 
same thing in two ways without knowing it; cp. Kripke. One can character-
ize corresponding notions of concept*, language*, and their cognates. These 
notions, normative in more than one way, may be of interest for certain 
purposes. Perhaps inquirers aspire to have languages* whose expressions* 
have meanings* that are instructions to build concepts* that can be constit-
uents of thoughts*. But my aim, more mundane, is to describe the thoughts/
concepts/meanings that ordinary humans enjoy. And I see no reason to be-
lieve that the best—or even a good—way to study concepts or meanings is 
by viewing them as imperfect analogs of their hyper-externalistic counter-
parts, even if we can and should try to acquire concepts*. Notions like truth 
and denotation may be required to interpret philosophical talk of thoughts*/
concepts*/meanings*. One can also hypothesize that ordinary words com-
bine to form sentences that express thoughts composed of concepts that de-
note or “are true of ” things in the environment. But this hypothesis does 
not become inevitable as soon as we talk about thoughts/concepts/mean-
ings. On the contrary, natural concepts seem to be mental symbols that can 
be used to think about things, even when the concepts apply to nothing. 
And if words like ‘give’ are used to access naturally introduced concepts 
like GIVE(_), we must be prepared to discover that words are used to access 
concepts that fall short of certain philosophical ideals.
4. Challenges for Ecumenicism
The ground-clearing maneuvers of the previous section put us in a po-
sition to explore residual differences between Pietroski and Brandom 
that threaten to be more substantive. As advertised, I hope to show 
that the initial appearances are misleading even in some of these cases, 
contrary to received opinion amongst philosophers of language. Still, 
I’ll ultimately admit defeat when we arrive at the very last topic—the 
banes of predication and singular terms.
4.1 E-language
One place to look for sources of substantive disagreement is in the 
vicinity of Chomsky’s infamous distinction between E-language and 
I-language (Chomsky 1986). Chomsky initially drew this distinction 
with the explicit intention of formulating a key difference between his 
approach to language and that of Quine, Lewis, and others—what was 
then arguably the dominant view. Given that Brandom was a student 
of Lewis’s and frequently pays homage to him in published work, the 
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question arises whether his view likewise falls prey to the compelling 
objections that Chomsky articulated decades ago. We can address this 
question by focusing on Pietroski’s more recent formulation of Chom-
sky’s insights.
Let’s begin with the distinction itself. What exactly is an E-language 
supposed to be?
Chomsky characterizes I-languages as procedures that connect interpreta-
tions with signals. Languages in any other sense are said to be E-languages. 
Chomsky … isolates a procedural notion and uses ‘E-language’ as a cover 
term for anything that can be called a language but isn’t an I-language. 
Thus, E-languages may include certain clusters of behavioral dispositions, 
heuristics for construing body language, etc. But Chomsky’s ‘I/E’ contrast 
does connote Church’s intensional/extensional contrast, and sets of inter-
pretation-signal pairs are paradigmatic E-languages. Though to repeat, 
such sets are often defi ned procedurally. (52)
This negative conception of E-languages (“anything that can be called 
a language but isn’t an I-language”) casts such a wide net that it can’t 
but apply to Brandom. Certainly, the latter is making no substantive 
psychological hypotheses about a computational system in the human 
brain. Nevertheless, as we’ll see, much of what Pietroski says in re-
jecting the study of E-language poses no confl ict with Brandom’s view. 
While he argues that David Lewis “wanted to describe our distinctively 
human language(s),” this is not the direction that Brandom takes. His 
project is to describe language as such, not “distinctively human lan-
guages.”
Although my broader claims by no means hang on a particular in-
terpretation of Lewis, it does seem to me that Pietroski’s reading of 
Lewis is not maximally charitable. I say this not because I think that 
his deep disagreements with Lewis somehow insidiously creep into his 
interpretation. Rather, I’ll argue that there’s a way of seeing Lewis as 
engaged in a wholly different project from the one that Pietroski foists 
on him. Still, whatever the case about Lewis, the project that I have in 
mind is the one that Brandom in fact undertakes—which, in my view, 
he carries out successfully, even if his teacher did not.
The subsections that follow distinguish three separate points of de-
bate: (i) extensional vs. procedural conceptions of grammar, (ii) a sen-
tence-fi rst vs. word-fi rst approach to semantics, and (iii) individualist 
vs. social conceptions of language.
4.1.1 Extensional vs. intensional constraints
In getting more precise about Lewis’s particular brand of E-lan-
guage, Pietroski highlights two points: (i) the metaphysical claim that 
language(s) are extensionally-specifi ed abstract objects—specifi cally, 
sets of meaning-pronunciation pairs—and (ii) Lewis’s conception of the 
process whereby a population comes to use such an object in social ex-
changes.
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Lewis’s proposal was that languages like English are sets [functions-in-
extension, not procedures] that are related to certain social phenomena via 
conventions of “truthfulness and trust.” He speaks in terms of populations 
“selecting” certain languages. The suggestion is that using a particular lan-
guage is like driving on the right: an arbitrarily chosen way of coordinating 
certain actions. (55)
One of the main things that Pietroski fi nds problematic here is that 
treating natural languages as functions-in-extension requires relin-
quishing the explanatory ambitions of generative linguistics—specifi -
cally, the aim of describing the cognitive structure that underlies, or 
even constitutes, human linguistic competence. Lacking an account 
of the cognitive architecture of FL, or the representational format in 
which it conducts its business, we have no empirically credible story 
about how adults accomplish real-time language processing, not to 
mention how children acquire the creative capacity to produce and con-
sume an indefi nite range of novel expressions.
Lewis says instead that “a grammar, like a language, is a set-theoretic en-
tity which can be described in complete abstraction from human affairs.” 
Chomsky offers a way of locating languages and grammars in nature. Lewis 
stipulates that each grammar determines the language (i.e., the set of sen-
tences) that it generates, but that languages do not determine grammars. 
So even if there is a Lewisian grammar for a certain set of Slang sentences, 
this does not explain how the relevant sentence meanings are related to lex-
ical meanings, or how speakers of the Slang know that the strings in ques-
tion fail to have certain meanings. At best, a Lewisian grammar indicates 
how a certain kind of mind might abstract lexical meanings from sentence 
meanings, given hypotheses about the relevant constituency structures and 
composition principles; see chapter three. But this doesn’t yet tell us any-
thing about how humans connect lexical meanings with pronunciations, or 
how we can/cannot combine lexical meanings. (59)
This all strikes me as correct. What Lewis should have been aiming 
his inquiry at language as such, regardless of which creature is using, 
acquiring, or “selecting” it. Setting aside Lewis, Brandom’s target ex-
planandum is “what it is to do the trick,” not “how the trick is done by 
us”—or, for that matter, by a dolphin, an AI robot, or a Martian. (I’ll 
suggest a friendly amendment to this point in 4.2). Chomsky, Pietroski, 
and other generativists, on the other hand, want to know about hu-
mans specifi cally. These are different projects, to be sure, but they’re 
not thereby rivals. Though they may well constrain one another, the 
relations between them can better be seen in terms of the “levels of 
analysis” picture that I proposed earlier.
In addressing Lewis’s account of how populations “select” a lan-
guage, Pietroski assumes that the target phenomena are suffi ciently 
similar between his inquiry and Lewis’s that the two are not only com-
mensurable with one another, but are actually in direct confl ict on vari-
ous key points.
Lewis asserts that £ is the language used in a population P “by virtue of the 
conventions of language prevailing in P;” where conventions, in his sense, 
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are special cases of mutually recognized regularities of action/belief in a 
population of individuals who can act rationally. He says that a convention 
of “ truth and trustfulness,” sustained by “ an interest in communication,” 
is what makes a particular set of sentences the language of a given popula-
tion. However, Lewis offers no evidence that this proposal is correct. And 
there is an obvious alternative: if a population P is small enough to make 
it plausible to speak of the language used in P, then the members of P will 
have acquired generative procedures that are very similar. So why think 
there are “facts about P which objectively select” a shared E-language, and 
not that members of P have similar I-languages? (60)
The answer that I suspect Lewis would give to Pietroski’s last ques-
tion in this passage is that there is no obvious way of individuating 
I-languages independently of the “forms of life”—i.e., communal prac-
tices—in which any linguistic creature is caught up. That’s because a 
discursive creature’s concepts and/or lexical items are constitutively 
related to the norms that structure those practices. Thus, if meanings 
really are instructions to fetch and assemble concepts, then we won’t be 
able to individuate meanings without appealing to such norms either. 
It’s not clear to me how Pietroski would (or could) respond to this point.
Pietroski’s critique of Lewis—particularly, his troublesome notion 
of “selection”—is carried forward in the following passage. What’s new 
here is that we have a direct quotation from Lewis making precisely 
the claim that I’ve been urging on his behalf—namely, that the genera-
tive grammarian’s target explananda are simply not the ones that he 
seeks to address.
According to Lewis, populations select languages by virtue of using sen-
tences in rational ways. So on his view, if language use is not a “rational 
activity” for young children, they are not “party to conventions of language” 
or “normal members of a language-using population.” [Lewis writes:] “Per-
haps language is fi rst acquired and afterward becomes conventional. . . . I 
am not concerned with the way in which language is acquired, only with 
the condition of a normal member of a language-using population when he 
is done acquiring language.” I don’t know what it is to acquire language in 
Lewis’s sense, or how he would describe whatever creolizers acquire. But 
even if one wants to focus on “normal” adults, ignoring acquisition may not 
be a viable option for those who want to fi nd out what Slangs and meanings 
are. Inquirers don’t stipulate how phenomena are related; they investigate.
In the end, I agree with Pietroski that Lewis’s talk of populations “se-
lecting” languages is hard to take seriously, especially in light of the 
Chomskyan alternative. Casting things in Lewis’s way plainly does 
leave the crucial process of “selection” unexplained—at least at the 
level of psychology, which is arguably where all the exciting action is 
at. Nor can I bring myself to credit the idea that the central aim of 
formal linguistics should forever be what Lewis said it should be—i.e., 
the extensional characterization of some abstract set (a moving target, 
as Pietroski points out, given the constant introduction of novel lexical 
items). But one can share Pietroski’s doubt that there’s any meaningful 
sense in which people “select languages”, as well as his broader anti-
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extensionalism, but nevertheless maintain that there’s a level of theo-
retical abstraction at which language is best viewed as a distinctively 
social phenomenon.
The conventions that govern the phenomenon in question might be 
“truthfulness and trust”, as Lewis thought, or they might be more ex-
plicitly normative, as in Brandom’s conception of socially-instituted as-
sertional and inferential commitments and entitlements. Likewise, the 
languages that such conventions institute might be static abstracta, as 
Lewis seems to have believed, or they might be fl exible, dynamic, and 
highly context-dependent social relations, as on Brandom’s account. 
The latter, moreover, has no theoretical use for the notion of “stable 
populations” that go around “selecting” various abstract objects—each 
of which somehow manages to answer to the label ‘Spanish’ (or what-
ever), despite their extensional differences.
There is, therefore, no call to reify such strange entities on the nor-
mative inferentialist picture. Neither linguistic phyla (e.g., Romance 
or Germanic) nor local dialects (2020 Boston English) need be real—
not in Lewis’s sense, anyway—in order for Brandom’s project to get off 
the ground. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the “communities” that 
Brandom appeals to in his account of norm-governed social practices 
can be as small as two creatures. (Actually, a footnote in MIE reveals 
that Brandom might even be willing to countenance something like 
an “I-thou relation” coming to be instituted by temporally asymmetric 
recognition of authority and responsibility relations between distinct 
time-slices of one and the same creature.) Thus, in principle, every new 
dyadic social interaction can serve to institute novel local norms, along-
side any that were previously shared. Whatever else Brandom might 
be accused of doing, then, attempting to individuate and reify stable 
(let alone timeless) public languages is no part of his brief.
4.1.2 The primacy of sentences
Having argued against Lewis’s metaphysical assumptions, Pietroski 
goes on to take issue with his methodological claim that semantic in-
quiry should begin by assigning meanings to sentences, rather than to 
subsentential expressions.
Lewis goes on to say “if σ is in the domain of a language £, let us call σ a sen-
tence of £.” But he wasn’t using ‘sentence’ as a technical term for any string 
to which a language assigns a meaning. Rather, Lewis initially restricted 
his notion of a meaningful expression to sentences. He later introduces talk 
of word meanings via talk of grammars. (55)
As we saw in our earlier discussion of Pietroski’s views on sentences, 
he views this sort of approach as being out of step with contemporary 
theorizing in generative linguistics.
Linguists have since replaced “S” with many phrase-like projections of func-
tional items that include tense and agreement morphemes, along with vari-
ous complementizers. This raises questions about what sentences are, and 
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whether any grammatical notion corresponds to the notion of a truth-eval-
uable thought. But theories of grammatical structure—and to that extent, 
theories of the expressions that Slangs generate—have been improved by 
not positing a special category of sentence. So while such a category often 
plays a special role in the stipulations regarding invented formal languages, 
grammatical structure may be independent of any notion of sentence. (61)
Here again, we must distinguish Lewis from Brandom. For the latter, 
the primacy of sentences for is not a mere stipulation, nor an irrational 
fetish for a specifi c syntactic type. Rather, his principal—and I think 
quite principled—grounds for isolating sentences at the outset of a nor-
mative pragmatic inquiry is that this is the only type of expression 
with which a can make an assertion—i.e., an explicit move in an norm-
governed inferential practice. Brandom’s concern with the normative 
structure of this “game of giving and asking for reasons” is what moti-
vates his focus on the role that assertions play, both in reasoning—as 
premises and conclusions—and also in communication. In the latter 
context, they serve the function of allowing speakers to undertake nor-
mative statuses—paradigmatically, commitments and entitlements.
Pietroski’s methodological counsel is to postpone discussion of com-
munication to a later day. As he remarks, specifying the structure of 
FL is work enough for one lifetime—surely more. But it doesn’t fol-
low from this that a theoretical inquiry with different aims must be, 
in some sense, second-rate, let alone illegitimate. Nor is it clear that 
the two inquiries are even in competition with one another over how to 
best to describe a common subject matter. As noted above, their com-
mon talk of “meanings”, “languages”, and the like might tempt one into 
thinking that the topic under discussion is the same for both theorists. 
But that would be a mistake. The two theoretical frameworks in which 
these terms are couched—and relative to which they have their theo-
retical import—are so dramatically different in respect of their explan-
atory aims that viewing them as even purporting to refer to the same 
phenomena is a bit of a stretch.
Unless I’m mistaken, Pietroski himself seems to have fallen into 
this trap, despite his earlier counsel to avoid such temptations. One 
clear place where he does so is in the following passage, which is no-
table for including—now for a second time—Lewis’s direct protests 
against being saddled with the views that Pietroski nevertheless goes 
on to attribute to him.
By contrast, Lewis held that sentences are prior to grammars. While grant-
ing that we should not “discard” notions like phrasal meaning (relative to a 
population P), or the “fi ne structure of meaning in P of a sentence,” he says 
that these notions “depend on our methods of evaluating grammars.” … For 
Lewis, a grammar Γ is used by P if and only if Γ is a best grammar for a lan-
guage £ that is used by P in virtue of a convention in P of “truthfulness and 
trust” in £. One might have thought that a “best” grammar for the alleged 
set £ would be one that best depicts the procedures acquired by members 
of P. But according to Lewis, “it makes sense to say that languages might 
be used by populations even if there were no internally represented gram-
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mars.” He then makes an even more remarkable claim. “I can tentatively 
agree that £ is used by P if and only if everyone in P possesses an internal 
representation of a grammar for £, if that is offered as a scientifi c hypoth-
esis. But I cannot accept it as any sort of analysis of “£ is used by P”, since 
the analysandum clearly could be true although the analysans was false.” 
Note the shift from Lewis’s opening question—what is a language?—to a 
search for an analysis of what it is for a language to be used by a population. 
… This shift is interwoven with the insistence that languages are sets of 
sentences, and a willingness to accept the consequences for how grammars 
are related to non-sentential expressions.
What Pietroski describes here as a “shift” in Lewis’s explanatory aims 
strikes me as a correct description of what Lewis was up to all along; 
or, at any rate, should’ve been.
Setting aside Lewis exegesis, we can turn again to Brandom, whose 
methodology is a good deal more perspicuous. As already noted, Bran-
dom rejects the “set of sentences” conception of languages, tying social 
norms to practices that are fl uid, socially distributed, and highly con-
text-dependent. Nevertheless, he can accept Lewis’s views (quoted in 
the passage immediately above) about grammars and about the status 
of subsentential expressions. Again, that’s because he motivates the 
primacy of sentences (or “full thoughts”) by reference to their roles in 
assertions, and hence in the norms governing the social practices in 
which assertion is a basic move. Such a practice need not be as articu-
lated as ours, in respect of either content or syntax. And while Pietroski 
is prosecuting an empirical inquiry into human psychology, Brandom’s 
is assaying the pragmatics of assertion, inference, and assessment.
Here is one fi nal bit of textual evidence for my suggestion that 
Chomsky and Pietroski, on the one hand, and Lewis and Brandom, on 
the other, are simply talking at cross purposes. Pietroski writes:
I think [Lewis’s] ordering of priorities is misguided. Slangs are child-ac-
quirable generative procedures that connect meanings with pronunciations 
in ways that allow for constrained homophony. So whatever meanings are, 
there are natural procedures that connect them with pronunciations in 
specifi c ways. Instead of adopting this promising starting point for an em-
pirically informed discussion of languages and meanings, Lewis offered a 
series of stipulations. Many others followed suit. But that doesn’t make it 
plausible that Slangs are sets. And if Slangs are I-languages in Chomsky’ s 
sense, then we shouldn’t ignore this fact when asking what meanings are. 
… [Lewis] adds that “the point is not to refrain from ever saying anything 
that depends on the evaluation of grammars. The point is to do so only 
when we must, and that is why I have concentrated on languages rather 
than grammars”. But in reply to a worry that he is needlessly hypostatizing 
meanings, he says “There is no point in being a part-time nominalist. I am 
persuaded on independent grounds that I ought to believe in possible worlds 
and possible beings therein, and that I ought to believe in sets of things I 
believe in.” So why be a part-time grammarist, given Chomsky’s reasons 
for thinking that children acquire generative procedures? Quine’s worries 
about the “indeterminacy” of meaning are not far away. But while Lewis 
speaks of evaluating grammars, he does not engage with Chomsky’s notion 
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of an evaluation metric, or the correlative notion of “explanatory adequacy”.
I suspect that the reason Lewis would give for being what Pietroski dis-
paragingly calls a “part-time grammarist” is that he is—as he says re-
peatedly—not concerned with specifi cally human languages, but with 
language as a general phenomenon. This, in any event, is the line that 
Brandom takes. And while Pietroski’s arguments in favor of his se-
mantic proposal are compelling in the context of his particular brand of 
inquiry, it’s diffi cult to make sense of his idea that a different “ordering 
of priorities” can be “misguided”. At worst, an ordering of priorities—
i.e., the adoption of some concrete set of methodological maxims, de-
scriptive aims, and explanatory ambitions—can fail to be illuminating 
about the domain that it carves out for itself. But it’s hard to see how 
this charge can be credibly leveled against Brandom’s inquiry, the re-
sults of which many philosophers—the present author included—fi nd 
deeply revelatory of communicative linguistic practices.
4.1.3 Public languages, dialects, and I-languages
Another context in which the notion of E-language has been invoked is 
to account for how folk terms like ‘Italian’ and ‘Swahili’ manage to pick 
out something in the world. Pietroski takes a dim view of this theoreti-
cal aim.
we can describe many I-languages as English dialects (or idiolects), without 
English being any particular language. Prima facie, there are many ways to 
be a speaker of English: American, British, and Canadian ways; young child 
ways, adult scientist ways; etc. Being a speaker of English seems to be a 
multiply realizable property whose instances are similar in ways that mat-
ter for certain practical purposes. We can use ‘English’ to group certain I-
languages together, perhaps in terms of paradigmatic examples, an intran-
sitive notion of mutual intelligibility—think of Brooklyn and Glasgow—and 
historically rooted dimensions of similarity. There need not be an English 
language that each speaker of English has imperfectly acquired; cp. Dum-
mett. We can use ‘Norwegian’ similarly, and classify both Norwegian and 
English I-languages as Germanic, without supposing that Germanic is a 
language shared by speakers of Norwegian and English. Analogies between 
linguistic and biological taxonomy can be preserved, whatever their worth, 
by thinking of specifi c I-languages as the analogs of the individual animals 
that get taxonomized—with ‘Human’ as the most inclusive category, and 
‘Indo-European’ indicating something like a phylum.
Turning to Brandom, we note once more that he is not seeking to taxono-
mize the natural languages of the human species. His theoretical aims 
do not require reifying or hypostasizing the norms that govern specifi c 
discursive interactions, nor individuating the entities that allegedly an-
swer to the names ‘English’ or ‘Norwegian’. There seems to be no prin-
cipled reason why Brandom couldn’t countenance Pietroski’s eminently 
reasonable view on these matters. Thus, when Pietroski describes a hy-
pothetical theorist who “grant[s] that children acquire I-languages, yet 
maintain[s] that Slangs are E-languages that connect pronunciations 
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with extensions of idealized concepts,” the theorist he is describing is not 
Brandom. If the latter were in the business of theorizing about Slangs, in 
particular, then he might indeed take up the hypothetical proposal that 
“each Slang is a social object that certain speakers acquire by internal-
izing a generative procedure and meeting some further conditions.” But 
no part of his actual view hangs on whether “English”, “British English”, 
or “Germanic” name metaphysically real entities, let alone ones that are 
individuated extensionally. Nor, again, is his theory a descriptive psy-
chological one. And it most certainly has no truck with extensions.
We can illustrate all this more clearly by considering a contrast that 
Pietroski draws between what he calls E-NGLISH (an E-language) and 
NGLISH (an I-language).
One might describe E-NGLISH in terms of the strings that certain people 
could understand as sentences, and the meanings they could assign to those 
strings, given a certain dictionary and a suitably idealized sense of ‘could’. 
But this presupposes that a competent speaker of NGLISH has an expres-
sion-generating procedure whose lexicon can be expanded. So we don’t need 
to invoke E-NGLISH to say what NGLISH is.
One can stipulate that if Amy, Brit, and Candice speak English, there is 
something that Amy, Brit, and Candice speak. But then the “thing spoken” 
may be a class of I-languages. One can stipulate that people share a lan-
guage if and only if they can communicate linguistically. But then “shared 
languages” may not play any role in explaining linguistic communication. 
Sharing a language, in the stipulated sense, may be a matter of using simi-
lar I-languages in combination with other human capacities and shared as-
sumptions about potential topics of conversation.
These, I maintain, are all claims that Brandom should be happy to 
accept. True, he holds that there are social norms governing the com-
municative exchanges of creatures who can understand and produce 
indefi nitely novel constructions. But he should have no qualms with 
the claim that humans happen to do this via some subpersonal psycho-
logical apparatus. Plainly, his account must presuppose that there is 
at least one way of “doing the trick”—our own—though it leaves room 
for others.
Ultimately, as I’ve emphasized throughout this discussion, the ap-
pearance of friction is, here as elsewhere, rooted in a cluster of verbal 
disputes. Underlying these is the fact that Brandom’s normative in-
ferentialism, while sharing many homophonous pieces of jargon with 
Pietroski, is pitched at a higher level of description, so to speak, than 
a cognitive theory of NGLISH. Thus, Brandom should grant that NG-
LISH—the psychological apparatus that a given speaker possesses—
can be specifi ed without any recourse to E-NGLISH (if such a thing can 
even exists in a sense that he would countenance).
Note that, if Brandom’s inferentialism is on the right track, then 
the “shared assumptions about potential topics of conversation” that 
Pietroski mentions are partly constitutive of the discursive norms that 
enter into an illuminating pragmatic account of communication. Need-
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less to say, these not be the only things that enter into such an account. 
At the level of phonological and morpho-syntactic processes, as well 
as the ability to access and assemble concepts, the computational—
and, ultimately, neurocognitive—explanation will surely be couched in 
the terms that generativists recommend. These are arguably subper-
sonal processes, which, again, is not the theoretical “level” at which 
Brandom’s account is pitched.2 A substantive disagreement can only be 
maintained if both inquiries have a shared target; this is, once again, 
not such a case.
Still, I think it must be admitted that a large part of what makes a 
cognitive theory of NGLISH theoretically interesting is that it enters 
into a larger account of how a specifi c creature—the human animal—is 
able to track, follow, articulate, challenge, reject, and revise the norms 
of discourse that have contingently arisen in its social milieu. This is 
not the only source of theoretical interest, of course. The biologically-
realized combinatorial principles that constitute NGLISH are a mar-
vel of neurocognitive information-processing, and should be studied by 
natural science as such, with the fascination that grips empirical lin-
guists and neuroscientists alike. Nevertheless, the internal operations 
of this apparatus would be of no adaptive use to a creature if they made 
no contribution to the shaping of a broader class of norm-governed so-
cial activities. And, biology aside, the beauty of the mechanism is only 
enriched, not diminished, when we take into account the social interac-
tions that it makes possible.
Famously, Chomsky (2016) rejects the idea that language is an ad-
aptation specifi cally designed for social/communicative purposes. He en-
tertains an alternative hypothesis to the effect that the narrow faculty of 
language—what Pietroski is here calling ‘NGLISH’—was initially an aid 
to individual thought, making it possible for recursive structures in the 
mind to be composed, and thus “entertained”. This hypothesis strikes 
many (including myself) as implausible, but even if it turns out to be 
true, Brandom’s claims would still hold. That is, it would remain the case 
that the creature’s newly-structured individual-level thoughts played a 
role in its profound re-shaping of the prevailing social norms. Had its 
thoughts or judgments—i.e., its normatively evaluable commitments to 
things being thus-and-s0—not somehow become entwined with broader 
social practices, they would not thereby have been commitments, whatev-
er else they might have been. This is because, lacking a social existence, 
there is no normative check on what the creature had committed itself 
to. The conceptual contents of the internal states of a solitary creature 
would thus be underdetermined to such an extent that it may be more 
accurate, not to mention fruitful, to view them as subpersonal states—or, 
at any rate, as something other than judgments (strictu dictu). But this 
reeks of the kind of terminological legislation that both Pietroski and 
Brandom repeatedly warn against, so I’ll leave the matter there.
2 I spell out what I mean by “subpersonal” in Pereplyotchik (2017: 7.3)
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Putting aside terminology, what Brandom is concerned to articulate 
is the general structure of pragmatic social statuses—e.g., commitment 
and entitlements—and how the norms that govern those statuses can 
be used in theorizing about the semantics of linguistic expressions in 
any language. The project is “general” in the sense that it designed to be 
applicable to any case of linguistic communication, not just the human 
case. How the norms of communication that we fi nd in humans today 
might have evolved in the distant past of our particular species is, once 
again, no part of Brandom’s explanatory target. Clearly, they emerged 
somehow, and the empirical story is bound to be fascinating. But all 
Brandom really needs to get his project going is the very broad claim—
empirical, though perhaps only by a courtesy—that some natural psy-
chological mechanisms underlie, and thus explain, in the descriptive 
naturalistic sense, any given creature’s facility with social norms.
One might suspect that there is nevertheless a substantive meta-
physical dispute in the vicinity. Brandom posits public linguistic norms, 
whereas Pietroski has no truck with public entities of any kind. But 
matters aren’t so clear. Consider how Pietroski characterizes two hypo-
thetical ontological views about what NGLISH really is: “We can iden-
tify NGLISH with an I-language, or perhaps a class of I-languages that 
differ only in small ways that are irrelevant for the purposes at hand.” 
But what the difference could there possibly be between positing an E-
language and positing “a class of I-languages that differ only in small 
ways that are irrelevant for the purposes at hand”? What ontological 
payoff, that is, can there be for a theorist who insists on I-languages 
and resemblance classes thereof, as opposed to public languages—or, at 
any rate, theoretically useful public linguistic entities (TUPLEs)?
Pietroski hints that the issue may have to do with other meta-
physical features of E-NGLISH and NGLISH, including their modal 
properties: Whereas “a Slang seems to have its composition principles 
essentially, … E-NGLISH includes no composition principles; the set 
contains only string-meaning pairs, atomic and complex.” The differ-
ence is that sets are individuated by their members, but “any initial 
list of atomic expressions can be updated.” Pietroski’s point, if I under-
stand it correctly, is that the ongoing process of language change cre-
ates a moving target for semanticists like Lewis. As new lexical items 
emerge (or “go extinct”) in the actual world, the set that such a theorist 
intends to pick out changes. Indeed, Pietroski quips that “[i]dentifying 
Slangs with sets of expressions is like identifying animals with sets 
of molecules, and insisting that growth be described as replacing one 
animal with another. Even if this metaphysics is coherent, it may not 
cohere with plausible biology and linguistics” (57).
It isn’t clear, though, why this sort of consideration couldn’t be 
pressed just as hard with regard to I-languages. Although Pietroski 
says that “a Slang seems to have its composition principles essentially,” 
he plainly acknowledges that I-languages, conceived of as a psycho-
logical procedures, can also be updated. For instance, “communicative 
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failures can lead children to modify their (still modifi able) procedures 
for connecting meanings with pronunciations, subject to constraints” 
(58). Indeed, it seems to be an empirical hypothesis whether all of the 
elements of Pietroski’s own cognitive/semantic proposal in CM come 
online in the child’s I-language at the same time. Perhaps I-languages 
initially allow only instructions for combining monadic concepts, and 
only add (limited) dyadicity later in the maturational process. If the 
latter, then we might ask, “Is this a new I-language?” More important-
ly, how could we tell?
On the assumption that I-languages have their lexical entries 
and composition rules essentially, we can adapt Pietroski’s animals/
molecules analogy, seeing a child’s Slang as a succession of distinct 
I-languages—one for each day, week, month, or year. This entails that 
a child’s Slang over the course of a year can be a set of signifi cantly 
different I-languages. Though it is doubtless amenable to empirical in-
quiry, the question, “How many I-languages per day?” seems at best 
metaphysically awkward. Similarly, Pietroski holds that “dialectical 
variation … makes appeal to a single set of English expressions seem 
silly.” Rightly so. But, again, the same considerations apply to the I-
languages of speakers who are competent in many “dialects” or “lan-
guages” (as the benighted folk call them).
What are the individuation conditions on I-languages, in light of 
these considerations? In Pereplyotchik (2017: ch. 3), I argued that the 
answers to such questions are not much clearer in the case of I-lan-
guages than for the case of E-languages. I suspect that it will remain so 
for the duration of sustained inquiry in the decades to come.
4.2 Philosophy has not failed cognitive science
In a recent paper, provocatively titled “Why Philosophy Has Failed 
Cognitive Science,” Brandom argues that analytic philosophy, exempli-
fi ed in the work of Frege, has devoted a great deal of energy to clarify-
ing the nature of logical and semantic notions, but that we’ve thus far 
failed to properly hand off the fruits of our heritage to researchers in 
cognitive science.3 The present section is devoted to a survey of the 
claims that Brandom makes about this alleged failure. I’ll argue that 
Pietroski’s work provides a direct counterexample to several of these 
claims, but that Brandom is right to point out that many theorists, in-
3 Recognizing that cognitive science is comprised of many fi elds, Brandom 
aims his criticism more directly at philosophers who work on topics in cognitive 
psychology, developmental psychology, animal psychology (esp. primatology), and 
artifi cial intelligence, rather than at those who study topics in neurophysiology, 
linguistics, perceptual psychology, learning theory, and memory. Admittedly, this 
is a strange way to cut up the terrain. In particular, for our purposes, it’s not at 
all clear why philosophers of linguistics are not on Brandom’s list of targets. But 
let’s not dwell on this. If only for the sake of furthering our present inquiry, I’ll 
include philosophers and language and linguistics in the list, making no exception 
for myself.
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cluding Pietroski, hold commitments that Frege’s insights should lead 
us to reject.
4.2.1 Modes of inquiry, philosophical and scientifi c
Brandom recounts the way in which modern approaches to logic and 
semantics began with Frege’s Begriffsschrift, which furnished us with 
a new logic and new ways of thinking about meaning. Russell then 
showed us how to apply these ideas more generally in philosophy. But, 
while the ideas that Frege and Russell developed about logic and se-
mantics were quite general in their import, later theorists to attempt-
ed, with variable success, to apply those general ideas to the specifi c 
case of natural language—i.e., the system of representation that nor-
mal human children acquire. This, no doubt, has to do our sheer fa-
miliarity with the only clear case of language use available—i.e., our 
own—coupled with the anthropocentrism that motivates any inquiry 
into language. The resulting confusion had the effect of blurring the 
lines between a general philosophical theory of language, on the one 
hand, and an empirical linguistic inquiry into the special case of hu-
man linguistic competence. That, Brandom maintains, is a mistake. On 
his view, the kind of inquiry that Pietroski is engaged in deals with the 
contingencies and the specifi cs of how humans acquired conceptual and 
linguistic abilities. Philosophy, by contrast, deals with the “normative” 
question of what counts as “doing the trick” for any creature.
Although I’ve followed Brandom in putting the point this way 
through the discussion so far, I must now register that this is not, in my 
view, the best way of saying what I think Brandom intends to say here. 
At any rate, it’s not, by my lights, the point that he should be making 
at this juncture in the dialectic. For, one might legitimately wonder 
how “What counts as doing the trick?” gets to be a normative ques-
tion—whether in the case of language or of anything else—rather than 
a straightforward question of fact. Presumably, “What counts as being 
a horse?” is not a normative question, for the simple reason that horses 
are a natural type of object, studied as such by zoologists.4 Analogously, 
what counts as mastering a language may well be a matter of having 
acquired an I-language, in Pietroski’s sense. As a friendly amendment 
to Brandom, then, I will address this worry on his behalf by re-iterating 
and fl eshing out the proposal that I fl oated earlier in the discussion, 
regarding “levels of analysis”.
As I’ve noted, what Brandom (and probably Lewis) has on offer 
seems to be a high-level description of a theoretically interesting kind 
of social practice—specifi cally, (“what counts as a”) language game—
4 A theorist sympathetic to Brandom might reply that the notion “counts as” is 
normative because it’s a matter of what competences and abilities it is appropriate 
to ascribe to a creature. But, here again, a parallel move can be made in the case 
of horses, vis-à-vis the properties that are correctly ascribed to them (notably, the 
property of being a horse).
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with all of the impressive social, practical, and cognitive benefi ts that 
make this kind of practice worthy of careful study. Correspondingly, 
I suspect Pietroski’s proposal has its home in an inquiry pitched at a 
lower level of analysis. To fl esh the picture out further, it will be use-
ful to quickly rehearse a central tenet of the mainstream approach to 
“levels of analysis” in contemporary philosophy of science.
A view that posits multiple levels of theoretical analysis, whether in 
biology, computer science, or in the sciences overall, is not thereby com-
mitted to any particular story about how theoretical progress at any 
one level can, should, or must constrain theorizing at any other. True, 
the early proponents of a “levels of science” picture also attempted—
unsuccessfully, as it turns out—to secure a “unity of science” thesis. 
But later thinkers, notably Fodor (1975), generously disabused us of 
these lofty goals. What we know now is that theoretical pressure can 
and often does “go both ways”, with higher and lower levels informing 
one another in equal measure, and with equal authority. Lower levels, 
as such, are no longer seen as having an inherent epistemic privilege. 
This is a point that Chomsky, too, makes frequently.
Similarly, we can now appreciate the fact—poorly understood until 
fairly recently—that theories at different levels of inquiry are often to 
a large extent independent variables. A theorist who formulates a high-
level analysis of some phenomenon typically assumes—often with good 
grounds—that the generalizations they discover at that level might be 
implemented in any number of ways by lower-level mechanisms. That’s 
one half of the independence claim. The other half is best appreciated 
from the perspective of a theorist working at the (relatively) lower level 
of analysis. From this vantage point, the mechanisms, laws, general-
izations, and/or principles that are discovered, however “abstract” they 
might seem, are assumed to be just one instance of an even more gen-
eral phenomenon—a token of a potentially much larger type. 
What I want to recommend is that we apply these general consider-
ations from the philosophy of science to the concrete case of generative 
linguistics and normative inferentialism. Although it would be mis-
leading to say that the subject matters that these two research pro-
grams seek to address are literally orthogonal to one another, the grain 
of truth in that bit of imagery is this: Brandom high-level account is, 
as such, indifferent to how lower-level mechanisms might operate in 
various token instances. Pietroski, on the other hand, is assaying the 
fi ne-structure of the lower-level mechanisms, but only in the special 
case of human languages. As such, while the results of his inquiry are 
relevant to Brandom’s overall picture—indeed, they might pose dev-
astating problems for Brandom (see below)—they function in practice 
not as substantive theoretical constraints, but as an account of a very 
special case (particularly to us!) of the kind of story that Brandom pre-
supposes can be told for any creature to which his normative pragmatic 
account is applicable.
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If this is so, then how do we make sense of the fact that Brandom, 
like Lewis, explicitly appeals to data from natural language in motivat-
ing his analyses of phenomena that are, at least in principle, specifi c to 
our way of doing things? If the theory is not intended to be a contribu-
tion to a “merely parochial” inquiry about us, then why use examples 
from our language—indeed, almost exclusively from English, in par-
ticular—in constructing and developing it? There are two complemen-
tary ways of answering this question. The fi rst, already mentioned, is 
to point out that Brandom draws our attention to features of human 
languages (in practice, just English) not for the purpose of displaying 
empirical data that his account can explain, but, rather, to illustrate 
aspects of language that he believes have pragmatic or semantic ana-
logues in languages beyond the human case. (By analogy, think of the 
Chomsky hierarchy.)
The second prong of the reply consists of highlighting the fact that 
Brandom has devoted much time and effort to arguing—ultimately 
persuasively, in my view—that many of the linguistic devices he treats 
in his work are actually universal features of language as such. More-
over, as many generative linguists have pointed out in discussions of 
Universal Grammar, language universals need not be categorical; they 
can, instead, take a conditional form, e.g., “any language that has fea-
ture F will also have property P,” or “if a language can express content 
C, then it can also express content C*.” Brandom (2008) works out a 
detailed typology of such relationships between logically possible lan-
guages, including those that differ either in respect of their general 
expressive power, or in respect of more specifi c semantic devices (e.g., 
deixis). He takes this to be a pragmatic-cum-semantic version of Chom-
sky’s famous analysis of the syntactic hierarchies of expressive power.
The view that Brandom promotes throughout his discussions of this 
topic is that traditional philosophers of language, starting with Quine, 
directed their efforts at analyzing linguistic constructions that, by and 
large, shed light on quite general semantic phenomena—i.e., ones that 
we can hope to one day discover in other species (terrestrial or other-
wise), or to build into our intelligent robots. Although such linguistic 
devices might seem, from the perspective of a modern-day linguist, to 
comprise a rather motley collection—why propositional attitude re-
ports but not, say, ergative verbs?—the tie that binds them, according 
to Brandom, is one that we can best appreciate from the vantage point 
of a (high-level) normative inquiry into general pragmatics. The lin-
guistic phenomena that Quine and others identifi ed early on as being 
particularly germane to philosophy all have this in common: for each 
of them, there are good reasons to think that it’s not just something we 
happen to fi nd in distinctively human languages, but something that 
tells us about what a language is, irrespective of which creatures hap-
pen to use it or what subpersonal mechanisms they deploy in doing so.
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4.2.2 Frege’s insights
The lessons that Brandom believes philosophers have failed to pass on 
to their colleagues in the sciences pertain to four key distinctions, all 
due to Frege, between (i) labeling and describing, (ii) freestanding and 
embedded content, (iii) content and force, and fi nally (iv) simple vs. 
complex predicates.
The last of these, Brandom argues, opens up a semantic hierarchy 
that is no less important for cognitive scientists to be familiar with 
than the syntactic hierarchy that bears Chomsky’s name. Taking this 
hierarchy into account in the context of empirical theorizing would 
help, he claims, to characterize the phylogenetic and ontogenetic devel-
opment of linguistic and conceptual capacities. Such a characterization 
would move upward through what Brandom thinks of as “grades of 
conceptual content”, including the propositional variety, the quantifi -
cational refi nement, and ultimately the relational contents that Frege 
taught us to recognize.
We saw in 2 that Pietroski has a great deal to say about this. In-
deed, the Fregean considerations that he surveys in the service of an 
avowedly naturalistic theory in cognitive science are precisely those 
that Brandom recommends to our attention (and then some). For Bran-
dom, Frege’s insight is that there are patterns in sentences that cannot 
be modeled as mere part-whole relations. For instance, although there 
is no expression that appears in “Herbie admires Jessica” and “Jessica 
admires Herbie” that doesn’t also appear in “Herbie admires Herbie”, 
the latter sentence exhibits an inferential pattern different from the 
other two—the pattern that we gesture at by employing notational 
distinctions between, e.g., admire(x,y) and admire(x,x), or by making 
explicit their inferential proprieties by embedding them inside of con-
ditionals, as in (2) and (3). 
(1) If someone admires anyone, then someone admires someone.  
(true)
(2) If someone admires anyone, then someone admires themselves. 
(false)
Thus, admire(x,x) expresses a kind of predicate that is not a part of a 
sentence, but an aspect of it, which we can recognize as an “inferential 
pattern” and model as an equivalence class of sentences. Frege’s device 
of function-application is a way of capturing this idea. Functions are 
not, in general parts of their outputs. (The function capitol-of(x) yields 
Kiev when applied to Ukraine, but neither capitol-of(x) nor Ukraine 
are parts of Kiev.) This is why sentential connectives can be modeled 
with Venn diagrams, but complex predicates cannot. Even the sim-
plest mathematics uses complex predicates—e.g., natural number or 
successor(x, y)—and Frege showed that, once you can build complex 
predicates, you can keep building endlessly more, in the manner we 
ran across in our discussion of Lewis’s type-theoretic semantics (2).
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As we’ve seen, Pietroski warns against taking for granted a crea-
ture’s ability to construct concepts of unbounded adicities. But the 
warning is intended to apply only when doing natural-language se-
mantics. For other purposes, Pietroski agrees that Frege’s insights are 
of foundational and lasting importance. Moreover, the hypothesis that 
he develops posits thoughts that admit of a Fregean semantic treat-
ment (perhaps even a truth-conditional one), but it requires these to 
fi rst be converted, via Frege’s process of concept invention, into the 
kinds of thoughts that are “legible”, so to speak, to the human lan-
guage faculty. While it’s not clear what independent empirical evidence 
Pietroski might offer for positing psychological mechanisms that facili-
tate such a translation—I am aware of no obvious analogue in the case 
of other perceptual modules—what is clear is this: Brandom’s conten-
tions regarding Frege’s distinction (iv), between simple and complex 
predicates, are rendered moot by the very existence of Pietroski’s work, 
which presents an up-and-running empirical inquiry that is deeply in-
formed by Frege’s core contributions.
Matters are much less clear with regard to the other three distinc-
tions that Frege was at pains to draw. Let’s turn now to his distinction 
between labeling and describing.
4.2.3 Sentences, predicates, and classifi cation
Brandom points out that old-school scholastic accounts of thought were 
rooted in a classifi catory account of concepts—a relic of Aristotelian 
“forms”. The medievals noticed that, once you have singular terms 
and classifi cations, you can build up to an account of truth, and then 
analyze good inference in terms of truth-preservation. Pietroski un-
abashedly endorses this strategy—in particular, the Aristotelian focus 
on classifi catory concepts, which are central to his predicativism about 
New Mentalese (2).
This raises the question: What exactly is classifi cation? How does 
a predicate get to perform its semantic function? Here is Pietroski’s 
answer:
…intuitively, a predicate classifi es things, into those that meet a certain 
condition (e.g., being a rabbit) and those that do not. Anything that meets 
the condition satisfi es the predicate, which applies to anything that meets 
the condition. We can invent perceptible predicates. Though for now, let’s fo-
cus on predicative concepts, like instances of RABBIT. I assume that many 
animals have such mental predicates. … [A] predicate may apply to each of 
[several] things, or to nothing. But these are just special cases of classifying. 
…even if logically ideal predication is relational as opposed to classifi catory, 
there seems to be a psychological distinction between relational and clas-
sifi catory concepts, even if we speak of monadic/dyadic/n-adic predicates. 
What I see, both here and throughout CM, are inter-defi nitions of se-
mantic notions like “applies to,” “classifi es,” “satisfi es,” and “meets con-
ditions.” Although Pietroski has made it clear that he is not trying to 
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“break out of the intentional circle,” to use Quine’s memorable phrase, 
the account he provides does not, to my mind, do much to illuminate 
the phenomenon in question. A diversity of labels allows us to conjure 
different clusters of theoretical intuitions. But none of these seems defi -
nite enough to make progress with.
Turn, then, to Brandom’s answer, which has the virtue of laying 
out substantive proposals and refi ning them, arriving ultimately at 
one that meets various important desiderata. Like Pietroski, Brandom 
maintains that “classifying” is not the obtaining of some (super)natu-
ral relation between a concept and (a portion of) the actual world—let 
alone non-actual possible worlds. On his view, there are, instead, acts 
of classifi cation—e.g., asserting “That’s a rabbit,” or tokening the cor-
responding perceptual thought (“LO, IT RABBITETH!”). We’ve already seen 
the details of Brandom’s account of assertion, as well as his (subordi-
nate) account of classifi cation. Let’s now approach the latter from a 
different direction, this time contrasting Brandom’s view with extant 
rivals.
If asked, straight-out, “What is classifi cation?,” the knee-jerk re-
sponse that most philosophers would offer is that classifi cation is a 
matter of differential responsiveness. This is a start, but it leaves wide 
open the question of what vocabulary we’re permitted to use in de-
scribing the objects, properties, and events to which a physical system 
might be differentially responsive. If we give ourselves free reign, then 
the notion becomes too cheap to do serious work; differentially respond-
ing to Italian and French operas would count as classifying them, re-
gardless of how the trick was done. But, of course, one wants to know 
how that sort of thing happens, not just that it does. Unfortunately, 
pursuing the answer to this explanatory question by restricting our 
vocabulary to only naturalistically respectable terms quickly lands us 
with panpsychism—a bridge much too far. For, as Brandom points out, 
even a chunk or iron differentially responds to varying amounts of oxy-
gen in its surroundings, e.g., by rusting.
Equally vacuous is the (unqualifi ed) suggestion that we acquire 
predicative concepts, and hence classifi catory powers, by performing a 
process of “abstraction” from either the intrinsic qualities of states of 
sentient awareness—as Hume, Russell, and Carnap all held at various 
points in their otherwise distinguished careers—or from the raw infor-
mation supplied by sensory mechanisms, as naturalist like Neurath 
might have it. Without a detailed and well-motivated account of the 
operation of “abstraction”, the acquisition of classifi catory concepts has 
been labeled once more, but remains stubbornly unexplained.
To their credit, naturalists like Fodor and Dretske attempted to 
meet the problem head-on. Information-carrying states count as clas-
sifi catory concepts, they argued, when they’re embedded in suitably 
complex systems—ones that reliably keep track of their environment, 
learn, and behave fl exibly, perhaps on account of their history of natu-
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ral selection and innate resources. Burge (2010) adds to this list the 
requirement that the reliable tracking abilities must have the shape of 
perceptual constancies, not mere sensory registrations.
Brandom maintains that no such project can work, even in prin-
ciple, precisely because it ignores Frege’s conceptual distinction be-
tween mere labeling and full-blown describing. A case of labeling is one 
in which items are differentially sorted, but only extensionally, such 
that no specifi c inferential consequences can be drawn from the pres-
ence of the label. A magic wand might tell us that doorknobs, pet fi sh, 
and crumpled shirts are all and only the items that share the magic 
feature, F. But without knowing what F is, in intensional terms, we 
have no idea what, if anything, follows from the application of the label 
‘F’—i.e., what, in the fi ctional scenario, is semantically achieved by the 
activation of the wand. In order for this (or any other) physical signal 
to become more than a mere label, it must be inferentially articulated, 
in the sense that there have to be things that follow from something’s 
being F, as well as things that can have an instance of ‘F’ in their infer-
ential consequences.5
One of Frege’s key lessons, then, is that inferential signifi cance 
is central to conceptual content. Some concepts have only inferential 
conditions of application, not perceptual ones—either contingently, 
as with GENE, or necessarily, as with POLYNOMIAL or FRICTIONLESS PLANE. 
One can, of course, call things “concepts” even when they meet less 
stringent conditions. But, in that case, one should be sure to note the 
difference between differential responsiveness and inferential articula-
tion. Moreover, these points hold irrespective of whether a differential-
response capacity is innate or learned, and they apply just as much 
Boolean compounds of more basic units of differential responsiveness—
i.e., compound labels.
While it’s impossible to credit Brandom’s claim that philosophers 
like Pietroski have taken insuffi cient notice of Frege’s foundational in-
sights, there is something to be said, I think, for his criticism on this 
5 Following Dummett’s counsel, Brandom urges that we take into account both the 
circumstances and the consequences of applying a concept. For some nonsynonymous 
propositions, the antecedent circumstances coincide, but the inferential consequences 
serve to distinguish their contents. For instance, consider the contrast between “I 
will one day write a book about anarchism” and “I foresee that I will one day write a 
book about anarchism.” The inferential antecedents (“circumstances”) of these two 
claims might be the same, but the inferential consequences are different. This point 
applies even to observational concepts—e.g., MOVING or MOTION. A motion detector or 
a well-trained parrot that reliably emits the sound /Moving/ when there is, in fact, 
movement afoot (and not otherwise) does not thereby have the concepts in question. 
For although the circumstances of application are right, there are no inferential 
consequences to speak of in these cases. Brandom also makes the helpful observation 
that operators can serve to distinguish concepts that share both circumstances and 
consequences of application. For instance, the concepts HERE and WHERE-I-AM are 
shown to be distinct when interacting with the temporal operator ‘always’: “It’s nice 
here/where I am” vs. “It is always nice here/where I am.”
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particular point. As we’ll see below, Pietroski’s views on classifi cation 
don’t seem to respect the distinction (whether it be Frege’s or Bran-
dom’s) between labeling and describing. This has downstream conse-
quences for Pietroski’s view that really do seem to be out of step with 
Brandom’s theoretical commitments.
The disagreement about classifi cation is joined when Brandom as-
serts that thinking about something, as in “We’re still thinking about 
his tax returns,” is a matter of tokening complete thoughts—i.e., inten-
tional states that can be expressed by linguistically competent crea-
tures only in complete speech acts, which requires producing complete 
sentences (if only in the paradigmatic case). Pietroski, by contrast, fol-
lows the peculiar philosophical convention of using the phrase “think-
ing about” to denote a punctate event of conceptual classifi cation. While 
he agrees with Brandom that having a thought requires tokening a 
“sentential concept”, he also maintains that all concepts are “ways of 
thinking about things.”
This is where Brandom would disagree, on account of his com-
mitment to the effect that subsentential concepts are not complete 
thoughts. According to him, tokening such a concept cannot by itself 
constitute “thinking about something”. To do that, subsentential con-
cepts must (in some way) participate in a sentential one. So while 
sentential concepts are correctly described as “ways of thinking about 
things,” Brandom follows Frege in viewing subsentential concepts as 
aspects of such ways. Thus, whereas Pietroski claims that “hearing 
‘Bessie’ can… activate the denoter BESSIE, thereby leading [one] to think 
about Bessie in a singular way” (108), Brandom would deny that acti-
vating the denoting concept BESSIE can alone constitute thinking about 
Bessie—in any way—even once. This point about “denoters” applies 
also, mutatis mutandis, to predicative concepts.
Pietroski can, of course, stipulate that thinking about things doesn’t 
require tokening complete thoughts. But it’s diffi cult to see what could 
motivate such a move. Relying on brute introspection, one might fancy 
that singular reference has taken place with only one subsentential 
concept in play—e.g., “I’m quite certain that I was just thinking of tofu; 
not anything about it, specifi cally; just… tofu.” However, such intro-
spective judgments are known to be an extremely unreliable source of 
data, whether performed by naïve speakers or by theoreticians.6 One 
might, more plausibly, appeal to the theory of perception developed by 
Burge (2010), according to which perceptual awareness involves the 
application of only subsentential concepts, modeled on noun phrases. 
But this won’t do, either. For, if judgments and classifi cations are all 
“sentence-sized”, as Brandom argues, then even the perceptual mental 
attitude of noticing can’t properly be treated as a case of applying just 
6 Distinct methodological troubles plague both of these two options, but they all 
strike me as insuperable and not worth discussing here. See Dennett (1991) for a 
primer.
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one classifi catory concept. Noticing rabbits involves judging that there 
are rabbits in the relevant spatiotemporal vicinity, and making such 
judgments requires deploying concepts other than the classifi catory 
predicate, RABBIT(_)—e.g., the concept HERE(_).
With all this in mind, I think we should side with Brandom in say-
ing that subsentential concepts play a role in acts of classifi cation, 
where the latter are construed as either as public assertions or as in-
ner endorsements of judgable contents. I see no reason to assume that 
tokening a subsentential concept is suffi cient to carry off an act of clas-
sifi cation. Nor is it obvious that classifying is a function of all concept 
application, as Pietroski believes. Does wondering whether Bessie ex-
ists really require classifying her? The latter question brings us face-to-
face with the Fregean distinction between force and content, to which 
we now turn.
4.2.4 Force and content
Brandom draws our attention to an ambiguity that was long ago point-
ed out by Wilfrid Sellars—the so-called “-ing/-ed” ambiguity—which 
allows us to use words like “claim” and “thought” polysemously to de-
scribe speech acts and propositional attitudes in respect of their inten-
tional contents, on the one hand, and in respect of their illocutionary 
force or “mental attitude type”, on the other. With regard to the latter, 
Stephen Schiffer has popularized the imagery of different “boxes” in 
the mind—one that corresponds to the functional role of beliefs, an-
other to that of desires, a third one for intentions, and so on. Pietroski 
likewise notes the distinction in the following passage from CM.
One needs to be careful with the terminology, since words like ‘thought’ 
and ‘concept’ are polysemous with regard to symbols and contents; ‘thought’ 
and ‘judgment’ are also like ‘assertion’, which can be used to describe cer-
tain events that can be characterized in terms of contents. In speaking of a 
thought that Sadie is a horse, one might be talking about a mental episode, 
a mental sentence, or a content shared by various sentences.
Brandom goes on to argue that this distinction is not only useful for 
theorists, but that it also marks a distinct level of conceptual sophisti-
cation. Creatures who can tell the difference between the act of assert-
ing and the content of what’s asserted can be said to be aware, at least 
implicitly, of the force/content distinction. To make this awareness ex-
plicit, a creature can embed a sentence inside of a conditional, thereby 
stripping it of its force.7
Now, on the assumption that classifi cation is, in fact, a kind of il-
7 Brandom illustrates how conditionals can be used to distinguish those 
inferential consequences that derive from the content of what’s said from those 
that derive from its force. Witness, for instance, the strikingly different inferential 
consequences of the sentences “p” and “I believe that p” when embedded as 
antecedents in conditionals: “If p then p” is obviously true for all values of ‘p’, but “If 
I believe that p, then p” is not foolishly arrogant for a mere mortal to assert, but also 
disastrously false in all known cases.
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locutionary force, Brandom concludes that the assertion ‘If Fa then Ga’ 
cannot, in point of fact, be used to classify a as F, despite invoking 
both ‘a’ and ‘F ’.8 This is another place where his views on the nature of 
classifi cation come into confl ict with Pietroski’s. And, here again, I can 
think of no plausible way around it.
One might suggest, on Pietroski’s behalf, that we seem to be able 
to simply entertain a notion—e.g., to contemplate “justice” or “the pos-
sibility of pigs fl ying”—without thereby committing ourselves to any-
thing at all. This, Brandom points out, goes back to Descartes’s view 
that one can fi rst “entertain” an idea/proposition and then, by an act 
of mental will, either endorse or deny it, yielding either a committal 
judgment or a positive doubt. Pietroski’s picture of concept-assembly 
likewise points in this direction. On that model, the process of assem-
bly eventuates in the construction of a “polarized sentential concept”, 
which is then shipped off to central cognition for endorsement, rejec-
tion, or further contemplation.
But this idea is at odds with Kant’s equally compelling observation 
that concepts have contents only in virtue of their role in judgment. 
Pushing still further, Frege argued that entertaining propositions is 
a late-coming ability that involves a thinker embedding a proposition 
into the antecedent slot of a conditional—as in the following soliloquy: 
“What if p? Well, if p were the case, then q would also; but that would 
mean that neither r nor s…”. If Frege’s proposal is correct, then the 
ability to “entertain an idea” piggy-backs on two prior abilities—viz., to 
assert conditionals, and then to perform inferences that take them as 
premises or conclusions (e.g., hypothetical syllogisms).
Now, Pietroski agrees that the mental act of endorsement results 
in a committal judgment, which both he and Brandom take to be sub-
ject to normative evaluation—i.e., assessments of correctness, warrant, 
rational propriety and the like. But it’s not clear how Pietroski’s ⇑/⇓ 
operators for assembling polarized sentential concepts facilitate this 
act of endorsement. More generally, Pietroski’s proposal seems to have 
little to offer in the way of a subpersonal about how any kind of force/
attitude is superadded, so to speak, to polarized concepts, after the Be-
griffsplans get done assembling them.
4.3. Predicates and singular terms
We turn now to our very fi nal topic, which concerns a foundational dis-
agreement between Brandom and Pietroski on the nature of singular 
and predicative concepts. Recall that Pietroski’s semantics for natural 
language is resolutely predicativist, in the sense that it recognizes no 
analogue of type-<e> expressions—intuitively, singular terms—i.e., no 
instruction for fetching singular concepts. Recall as well that he does 
8 Likewise, he warns against confl ating denial and supposition—two kinds of 
force—with negation and conditionalization, which are semantic functions that 
directly participate in the content.
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countenance the presence of such concepts in the human mind and 
that he recognizes the useful cognitive roles that such concepts play in 
thinking/reasoning. But this kind of cognition is couched in Olde Men-
talese—the phylogenetically ancient representational format in which 
pre-linguistic thought was conducted, and which Pietroski thinks we 
still employ today, outside of language use.
Brandom develops a powerful argument to the effect that any lan-
guage that fails to draw a distinction between predicates and singular 
terms is in principle barred from introducing basic logical operators—
including both negation and the conditional. If this argument is suc-
cessful, it would have no effect at all on Pietroski’s claims about Olde 
Mentalese, which happily draws that distinction. But it would seem 
to present a rather major problem for Pietroski’s main proposal about 
natural-language semantics, which has predicativism as one of its core 
commitments. So it behooves us, in surveying the points of discord be-
tween them, to focus on this foundational case, using it to draw out 
related points of contention about syntax.
4.3. Brandom’s argument
“What are subsentential expressions?” and “Why are there any?” These 
are the two questions that Brandom raises in an essay of the same title 
(2001: ch. 4). In 1, we glimpsed the overall shape of his answer. Here, 
we’ll reiterate the main points and look at some of the details. The 
reason for doing so is that this is the last—and arguably most chal-
lenging—of the issues that divide Brandom’s normative inferentialism 
from the overall generative enterprise. 
In the reconciliatory spirit of my overall project, I’ll propose a pos-
sible strategy for ameliorating the dispute. But I should concede from 
the outset that this appears to be a particularly stubborn issue. This is 
frustrating, as the issue obviously cuts pretty deep. Having laid out the 
details of Brandom’s diffi cult argument, I’ll settle, in the end, for having 
raised the question—one that hasn’t been discussed, to my knowledge, 
anywhere else in the literature—of how generative grammar might be 
(in)compatible with Brandom’s substitutional approach to syntax.
4.3.1 Details and a proof
As noted earlier, Brandom agrees with Pietroski that discerning sub-
sentential expressions is what makes it possible for us, both as theo-
rists and as language users, to “project” proprieties governing the use 
of novel sentences. Once we’ve done this, we can then recombine sub-
sentential items into new expressions, with meanings/contents that 
were previously inexpressible. Brandom recommends using the notion 
of substitution for this purpose, adapting Frege’s insight that discern-
ing meaningful subsentential expressions is a matter of treating sen-
tences as substitutional variants of one another.
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In spelling out the syntactic side of this technical notion, Brandom 
begins by identifying three “substitution-structural roles”. These in-
clude the role of being an expression that is (i) substituted in, (ii) sub-
stituted for, and (iii) a substitutional frame. For instance, “David ad-
mires Herbie,” is substituted in to yield a substitutional variant, such 
as “Herbie admires Herbie,” where the expression ‘David’ has been 
substituted for. The residual substitutional frame is what’s is common 
to the two substitutional variants—schematically, “x admired Herbie.”
On the semantic side, a substitutional variant of a sentence will 
be defi ned in terms of the inferences that it enters into, as a prem-
ise or a conclusion. In keeping with his inferentialist project, Bran-
dom develops the idea that the meaning of a subsentential expression 
consists in the materially correct substitution inferences involving that 
expression—i.e., inferences in which the conclusion is a substitutional 
variant of one of the premises. Thus, ‘Herbie’ has the meaning that it 
does partly in virtue of its role in a vast range of materially good infer-
ences, including the single-premise inference from “Herbie barked” to 
“My dog barked” (as said by me).
With this in mind, Brandom notes that substitution inferences 
come in two fl avors: symmetric and asymmetric. The above inference, 
from “Herbie barked” to “My dog barked”, is symmetric, in the sense 
that it’s materially good in either direction. Plainly, this trades on the 
identity between Herbie and my dog. This is more grist for Brandom’s 
logical expressivist mill. He captures this observation by pointing out 
that identity is the logical notion that we use to express—i.e., make 
explicit—the substitutional commitments that are central to our notion 
of singular terms (and, relatedly, of the items they purport to denote). 
Contrast this with the inference from “Herbie runs” to “Herbie moves”, 
which is materially good in only one direction, not in the other. That’s 
because ‘runs’ is materially stronger, in respect of inferential conse-
quences, than ‘move’; the former licenses all of the inferences that the 
latter does, and then some. The distinction between symmetric and 
asymmetric inferential proprieties governing substitution inferences 
is, as we’ll now see, the central aspect of Brandom’s distinction between 
predicates and singular terms. Let’s turn fi nally to his defi nitions of 
these two notions.
Each of the two defi nitions has a syntactic component and a se-
mantic component. On the syntactic side, Brandom says that singular 
terms invariably play the substitution-structural roles of being substi-
tuted for (as well as in), whereas predicates invariably play the role of 
substitutional frames. On the semantic side, he points out that the sub-
stitution of singular terms is always governed by symmetric inferential 
proprieties, whereas predicates are necessarily governed by at least 
some asymmetric ones. For instance, ‘Herbie’ is a singular term partly 
in virtue of the fact that, if the substitution inference from “Herbie 
barked” to “My dog barked” is materially good, then so is its converse. 
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Crucially, the same does not hold for the substitution inference from 
“Herbie runs” to “Herbie moves”, where the substitution of predicates 
is in play. That’s, again, because ‘runs’ is inferentially stronger than 
‘moves’. This is an instance of something that Brandom goes on to ar-
gue is constitutive of predicates as a class—viz., that they necessarily 
enter into at least some asymmetric substitution-inferential relations 
with other predicates in the language.
Thus far, Brandom has supplied an answer only to his fi rst ques-
tion: what are singular terms (and, by extension, predicates)? To sum-
marize, the answer is that singular terms play the syntactic roles of 
substituted fors and substituted ins, and the semantic role of entering 
solely into symmetric substitutional inferences. Predicates, by contrast, 
play the syntactic role of substitutional frames that necessarily enter 
into at least some asymmetric substitutional relations.
To ask why there are singular terms, then, is to ask the following 
question: Why do the syntactic and semantic substitutional roles line 
up as they do? This way of setting up the question allows us to gener-
ate a taxonomy of the logical possibilities, in terms of two binary pa-
rameters—syntax and semantics. We can thus imagine languages that 
instantiate the following four permutations.
i) Substituted for is symmetric and substitutional frame is sym-
metric.
ii) Substituted for is asymmetric and substitutional frame is sym-
metric.
iii) Substituted for is asymmetric and substitutional frame is asym-
metric.
iv) Substituted for is symmetric and substitutional frame is asym-
metric.
The option that’s actually instantiated by singular terms and predi-
cates is (iv). The question then becomes: What’s “wrong” with the other 
options?
What rules out option (i), according to Brandom, is that, many of 
the substitution inferences that are to be codifi ed and projected at the 
level of sentences by discerning subsentential expressions are asym-
metric. No weakening inferences could be generated if all subsentential 
components were restricted solely to symmetric inferences. What the 
remaining options have in common is that they assign asymmetric in-
ferential proprieties to expression-kinds that play the syntactic role of 
being substituted for. We can thus ask: what’s wrong with that combi-
nation? The answer to this question is where things become technically 
challenging. Readers who feel like skipping ahead to the next section 
can take with them only the upshot of the proof: If a language fi ts the 
model of options (ii) or (iii), then it does not permit the introduction of 
conditional contents (contrary to fact, in our own case).
Brandom invites us to consider the generalizations that permit ex-
pressions with subsentential contents to determine the proprieties of a 
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productive and indefi nitely fl exible class of novel combinations. Assert-
ing that Herbie is (identical with) my dog commits me to the propriety 
of all inferences of the form P(Herbie)  P(my dog). Similarly, for pred-
icates; asserting that anything that runs thereby moves commits one to 
the propriety of all inferences of the form Runs(x)  Moves(x). This is 
why, when such content-constitutive and potentially asymmetric sub-
stitutional commitments made explicit, they take the form of quanti-
fi ed conditionals—another feather in the logical expressivist’s cap.
Here, then, is Brandom’s proof that options (ii) and (iii) in effect rob 
a language of its most basic logical notions—even ones as simple as 
negation and the conditional.
The pattern corresponding to the hypothetical asymmetric signifi -
cance of “substituted fors” would replace identity claims with inequali-
ties. Let “t > t*” mean that P(t)  P(t*) is in general a good inference, 
but not every frame, P, will make the converse inference, P(t*)  P(t), 
materially good. Now, call a predicate Q an inferential inverse of a 
predicate P if, for all t and t*, the following condition is satisfi ed.
Inferential Inverse =df  if P(t)  P(t*) holds, but P(t’)  P(t) doesn’t,
     then Q(t*)  Q(t) holds and Q(t)  Q(t*) doesn’t
Thus, to answer the question of what’s “wrong” with options (ii) and 
(iii), it suffi ces to show that if every sentential substitutional frame has 
an inverse, then there can be no asymmetrically signifi cant substitut-
ed fors. The demonstration now proceeds by way of the following key 
lemma.
Lemma: In any language containing the expressive resourc-
es of elementary 
 sentential logic, every predicate has an inferential 
inverse. Conditional and negating locutions are 
inferentially inverting; e.g., inferentially weaken-
ing the antecedent of a conditional inferentially 
strengthens the conditional. Thus, if condition the 
antecedent of Inferential Inverse holds, the then the 
consequent can be shown to hold as well.
Proof: Let Q be defi ned as P r. It follows immediately that P(t*)
S(t*) entails P(t)S(t), but P(t)  S(t) does not entail P(t')S(t').
What this argument shows, if it shows anything at all (see below), is 
that conditional locutions are inferentially inverting precisely because 
they play the indispensable expressive role of making inferential rela-
tions explicit. (Mutatis mutandis for negation and other logical opera-
tors.) If this is right, then we can conclude, as Brandom does, that any 
language able to muster the expressive resources required for introduc-
ing basic sentential connectives will also draw a distinction between 
singular terms and predicates (as defi ned), assuming it has any sub-
sentential structure at all. Conversely, any language that forgoes the 
term/predicate distinction is thereby severely castrated in its expres-
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sive power—incapable in principle of introducing so much as a material 
conditional.
4.3.2 Potential replies
The foregoing argument was developed in Brandom’s was presented 
in its canonical form in MIE. (See also the later and more condensed 
treatment in Brandom, 2001). In the decades since then, many theo-
rists have marshalled a variety of technical objections against his line 
of reasoning. Some of these are based on straightforward confusions 
and can thus be defused without much concern (see MIE, ch. 6). Others 
might be more troublesome. Whatever the case about that, I want to 
ask what bearing this argument would have on Pietroski’s position if 
it were successful.
As noted above, the argument appears to present a serious prob-
lem for Pietroski’s commitment to predicativism, at least in the case 
of natural-language expressions and New Mentalese. (We can breathe 
easy about expressions of Olde Mentalese, which are in the clear.) How 
might Pietroski reply to this challenge? Closer to home, if this dispute 
can’t be resolved, does that spell doom for my larger reconciliation proj-
ect in the present essay?
One possibility is cut things off at the root by rejecting Brandom’s 
substitutional approach to both syntax and semantics. Indeed, this is 
most obvious route for Pietroski to pursue, given his claim that we can’t 
simply take for granted a creature’s ability to “slice out” terms from 
sentences, so as to use them in combinatorically constructing an infi -
nite hierarchy of semantic types, a la Frege or Lewis. Such a project, 
Pietroski argues, stipulates from the outset far more than it explains 
in the end. Suppose that he’s right about this. Does that mean that 
his empirical results—assuming for present purposes that that’s what 
they are—have literally contravened Brandom’s strategy? Put another 
way, if generative linguistics is the correct approach to natural lan-
guage, then are we barred from using Brandom’s “substitutional scal-
pel” to identify subsentential structure, distinguish between singular 
terms and predicates, and carry off the inferentialist project at the sub-
sentential level? I do not think so. Or, at any rate, I’m not convinced.
One excuse for my wavering on this point is that the considerations 
Brandom uses are so general—i.e., so totally independent of other de-
tails of the languages to which it applies—that it’s hard to see which of 
them Pietroski is really in a position to deny. True, substitutional syn-
tax smells a little too much like the old-school “discovery procedures” 
and “immediate constituent grammars” of benighted pre-Chomskyans 
(see Fodor, Bever, and Garrett, 1974 for a blistering refutation). But 
the methodological similarities, in my view, cut no ice. Nominalist dis-
covery procedures, were, for all their shortcomings, empirical hypoth-
eses about human languages. Otherwise, they wouldn’t even get to be 
rendered false by straightforwardly empirical arguments. By contrast, 
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we’ve seen that Brandom’s project, despite drawing on examples from 
English—again, for illustrative purposes only—is explicitly not pitched 
as an empirical inquiry into human language. So he can’t be accused of 
attempting to resurrect that old idea.
Nor is it clear that Brandom’s approach to the general project of de-
lineating syntactic categories is incompatible with further elaborations 
by the kind of syntax that Chomsky supplies. In the only passage I’ve 
found where he mentions generative grammar and its transformation 
rules (Brandom, 1987), he makes precisely that suggestion:
Recall … that Chomsky showed that one should not expect to generate the 
well-formed sentences of natural languages by concatenation, combination, 
or tree-structuring of any set of categories of this sort. To any such “phrase-
structure grammar” will have to be added transformations of such combi-
natory structures. Categorial classifi cations are just the raw materials for 
grammar in this sense, and don’t have anything to say about how one might 
proceed to the rest of the task of syntax once one has the categories. (165: 
fn. 2)
Lastly, we must consider how working syntacticians in the Chomskyan 
tradition go about identifying lexical items, morpho-syntactic catego-
ries, and other subsentential expressions. Needless to say, as a natu-
ralistic, descriptive enterprise, the practice is subject to change under 
empirical pressures. Still, for the present day, the most common pro-
cedure is to employ what syntacticians call “constituency tests”. For 
instance, the so-called ‘do-so’ test allows us to carve out phrases like 
the VP in (4) by reference to its behavior vis-à-vis (5), and then discern 
the more fi ne-grained syntactic units within that VP, by reference to 
(6) and (7).
(4) Jessica [VP swims quickly at the pool].
(5) Michael [does so], too. ‘Does so’ replaces ‘swims quickly 
at the pool’.
(6) Aron often [does so] at the beach. ‘Does so’ replaces ‘swims quickly’
(7) Hayes [does so] expertly in the tub. ‘Does so’ replaces ‘swims’
Identifying such subsentential (and subphrasal) structure was crucial 
to the development of X-bar theory in the GB framework, and contin-
ues to guide syntactic theorizing in the Minimalist tradition. Of course, 
the empirical details are not so simple. Syntacticians employ a large 
battery of tests, not all of which agree with one another in every case. 
Moreover, any of the tests (including the do-so test) can be challenged 
on empirical grounds and, in many cases, rendered otiose by discover-
ies about the inner workings of other natural languages, only superfi -
cially unrelated. Mercifully, the gory details are not our topic here. For 
present purposes, the key point is this: When a syntactician employs 
constituency tests, she is appealing to precisely the kinds of substitu-
tional relationships that Brandom’s syntax rests on. To be sure, more 
complex considerations enter into the picture. For instance, how a syn-
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tactic constituent can “move” (in grammars that allow movement, un-
like say, HPSG) is a kind of data widely relied upon to determine syn-
tactic category and constituency relations. But I see no reason why this 
too could not be cashed out in the language of substitutional syntax.
With this in mind, I’ll end with the following speculation. If, in a 
remarkably distant possible world, Brandom were to go in for some 
empirical theorizing about natural languages, it’s not clear to me that 
he would (or should) adopt anything other than generative grammar 
as the optimal theoretical framework within which to prosecute his 
inquiry. Certainly, he is well aware—how could he not be?!—of the 
theoretical need for Chomskyan grammars. On the rare occasion that 
he does mention these, he doesn’t say anything that even hints at a 
disagreement. (Recall, “Chomsky showed…”, my emphasis.) Moreover, 
his frequent invocations of the Chomsky hierarchy in discussions of 
computational procedures and the expressive power of various lan-
guages (e.g., Brandom, 2008: ch. 1) suggests no particular aversion to 
core generativist principles. To be sure, this isn’t very much to go on. It 
by no means shows that Brandom’s “substitutional syntax” is compat-
ible with (any particular) generative grammar. But the consideration 
to the contrary seem likewise thin.
Conclusion
Attempting to integrate the theories developed by Brandom and Pi-
etroski may strike some as an futile project, analogous to grafting, say, 
a squirrel onto a cow. One thinks to oneself, “Perhaps it can be done, 
but… why?!” In the foregoing pages, I’ve argued that this view of the 
matter constitutes a failure to appreciate the live opportunities for a 
fruitful merger. Such a merger is, like any large one, a daunting gam-
ble. But, it seems undeniable, from where I sit, that both Brandom and 
Pietroski have furnished signifi cant insights into the nature of some-
thing called “language”—a phenomenon that we should fi rmly resist 
regarding as unitary.
That having been said, it seems only natural to suppose that com-
bining the two theories will yield a richer overall picture than either 
theory can provide on its own. This sort of thing doesn’t always work 
out; not all teams of All-Stars are All-Star teams, after all. But even if 
the resulting view is not to one’s liking, I fi nd it frankly inconceivable 
that some such reconciliation project won’t have to be effected eventu-
ally. Perhaps we aren’t there yet; perhaps both generative linguistics 
and normative inferentialism must await more penetrating develop-
ments before their future descendants can be merged. (Or, again, may-
be the AI people blow our minds with some new-fangled contraption 
next Tuesday. Who knows?) Whatever the case about that, I hope to 
have convinced the reader that there are, in fact, very few substantive 
disagreements between the two approaches. What initially appear to 
be sharp contrasts turn out, on inspection, to be mostly benign differ-
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ences of theoretical focus and explanatory ambition.
I’ll close on a broadly sociological note. A mistaken commitment to 
the incompatibility of generative linguistics and normative inferential-
ism has had, I believe, negative consequences for both philosophy and 
linguistics. Specifi cally, there is, at present, little or no cross-talk be-
tween researchers working in these two traditions. Indeed, they seem 
to be as siloed off from one another as any two major research programs 
in “analytic” philosophy of language can be. If nothing else, by partially 
undermining the mistaken assumption of incompatibility, I hope to 
have gone at least some way toward rectifying the situation. My hope is 
that others will follow suit, attempting to forge still further connections 
between the two enterprises. Even if Pietroski and Brandom make for 
strange bedfellows, there is no question that they make for excellent 
guides. And, for better or worse, the terrain is largely uncharted. Let 
us press forward, then—as always, with optimism.
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